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REFORMING OHIO CORPORATE LAW AND
SECURITIES REGULATION TO FACILITATE
INVESTMENT IN OHIO
DAVE EBERSOLE*
Against a backdrop of theoretical and empirical
evidence, this article explains why and how the Ohio
General Assembly should reform Ohio corporate law and
securities regulation. As a foundation, theoretical and
empirical evidence explains why reforming Ohio corporate
law will facilitate investment in Ohio, including data
showing that Ohio corporate law raises the cost of capital
to Ohio firms. Further demonstrating that capital markets
disfavor Ohio corporate law, Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
failed in its recent attempt to reincorporate in Ohio.
This article next analyzes Ohio Revised Code sections
to specifically explain how clear corporate law
implementing non-extreme policy decisions in a
straightforward manner can remedy the complexity and
extremity that are the hallmarks of Ohio corporate law.
Following the statutory analysis, this article refutes
objections to reforming Ohio corporate law. This article
then concludes with a call for the Ohio General Assembly
to reform Ohio corporate law and securities regulation to
encourage firms located in Ohio to incorporate in Ohio.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio General Assembly should revise Ohio corporate law and
securities regulation to facilitate investment in Ohio. Ohio has tremendous
potential to improve its legal environment to benefit businesses and
investors. Presently, however, corporate governance under Ohio law is not
* Member of the Ohio Bar. All the views expressed herein are the author's own and
do not reflect the views of any organization. The author owes a great deal of
gratitude to Professor Dale Oesterle for his helpful advice and comments. Many
ideas contained in this article originated in Professor Oesterle's class lectures and
discussions. The author also thanks Professor Paul Rose for his helpful advice and
comments regarding this article. Any and all errors are the author's own.
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attractive to businesses and investors due to statutory complexity and policy
that leading scholars have "blacklisted as extreme.'''
Abercrombie & Fitch Co.'s recent attempt to reincorporate in Ohio is
strong evidence that Ohio should reform its corporate law.2 The
reincorporation attempt began when Abercrombie, a Delaware corporation
with its home office in New Albany, Ohio, filed a proxy statement
regarding reincorporation in Ohio in a way that appeared to evade public
attention.3 Abercrombie filed the proxy statement on December 22, 2010,
during the busy holiday season.4 In addition, the proxy statement curiously
purported to seek reincorporation because of benefits that were either
immaterial or already available to Abercrombie under Delaware law.5
Moreover, Abercrombie did not file a press release when it filed its proxy
statement.6 By some accounts, Abercrombie's management even failed to
respond to media inquiries about the proposed reincorporation. 7
These actions gave rise to speculation that Abercrombie's management
desired to reincorporate under Ohio law in preparation for a management
Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L.
& ECON. 383, 387 (2003) (citing Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate
Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 843 (1993) and
Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. EcoN. 525
(2001)) (identifying Pennsylvania and Ohio as states with corporate law that has
been "blacklisted as extreme" because it excessively protects management)); see
also Guhan Subramanian, The Influence ofAntitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U.
PA. L. REv. 1795, 1801 (2002) (identifying Ohio, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
as states with corporate law that is extreme).
2 See Steven Davidoff, A Long Weekend, and a Long List of News, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/a-
long-weekend-and-a-long-list-of-news/ ("We are about to have a field experiment
to see what these institutions think of Ohio law, whether I have overstated the case
and whether these shareholders agree with Glass Lewis and Abercrombie.").
3 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14(a)) (Dec. 22, 2010).
4 Steven Davidoff, Abercrombie's Ohio Express, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 23,
2010, 4:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/abercrombies-ohio-
express/.5id.
6 1d.
7 Steven Davidoff, The Next Stop on Abercrombie's Ohio Express, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/the-
next-stop-on-abercrombies-ohio-express/; Ken MacFayden, Abercrombie
Addresses MBO Talk, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.the
middlemarket.com/news/abercrombie-addresses-mbo-talk-216538-1 .html?ET=
mergersunleashed:e8178:247108a:&st-=email (stating that a call to Abercrombie
was not returned to the author by press time).
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buyout or to obtain a preferred acquirer without disclosing the scheme.8 In
light of the complexity of Ohio law, some suspected that the market might
overlook this potential purpose for reincorporation. 9 Indeed, Ohio corporate
law is so complex that experienced practitioners disagree about its nature.' 0
Nationally recognized proxy advisory firms even disagreed about how Ohio
corporate law would impact Abercrombie's proposed reincorporation."1
Underlying the management-buyout theory is extreme Ohio corporate
law that gives management nearly unbridled discretion in corporate
governance12 and protects management against takeovers to make such a
8 Davidoff, supra note 4; see also KERRISDALE CAPITAL MGMT., The Real Reason
Behind Abercrombie's Reincorporation in Ohio, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/247374-the-real-reason-behind-abercrombie-s-
reincorporation-in-ohio.
9 Davidoff, supra note 4 ("This is the time of year when news is announced in the
hope that no one will notice. You can't help but think that this was Abercrombie &
Fitch's intention with its filing on Wednesday."). Theoretically, public markets
incorporate all available information according to the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis (ECMH). The most common form of the ECMH is the semi-strong
theory. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 & n.1 (1970) (crediting Harry Roberts with
distinguishing weak and strong-form efficiency). Fama defines the semi-strong
theory to mean that capital markets reflect all information that is "obviously
publicly available." Id. at 383. In this case, the market confirmed the semi-strong
theory because shareholders presumably took public information regarding Ohio
corporate law's effect on Abercrombie into account when they rejected
reincorporation in Ohio. See also discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the efficient
market hypothesis); text and accompanying references infra note 56 (citing
references for the debate on market efficiency and shareholder primacy).
10 Compare David P. Porter, Competing with Delaware: Recent Amendments to
Ohio's Corporate Statutes, 40 AKRON L. REv. 175, 185 (2007) (stating that there
are fundamental differences between Ohio and Delaware law, as well as technical
differences in which Ohio has renounced specific legal doctrines developed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery), with Tim Feran, Abercrombie Responds to Critic of
its Plan to Reincorporate in Ohio, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/business/stories/2011/02/23/abercrombie-
responds-to-critic-of-reincorporation-move.html ("But the fact is, Ohio law isn't
drastically different from Delaware law-except for the fact that it's certain."
(quoting practitioner John Beavers)).
1 Davidoff, supra note 2 (comparing the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)
Report for Abercrombie & Fitch, Co.'s Feb. 28, 2011 proxy vote, which states:
"[t]he proposed reincorporation is not in the best interests of shareholders because
Ohio's takeover defenses and director liability provisions would represent a
diminution in shareholder rights," with the competing Glass Lewis report that finds
Ohio law incidental and recommends an affirmative shareholder vote).
12 Under Ohio law, there is effectively no fiduciary duty of care, which gives
management discretion in choosing a potential acquirer. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
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plan plausible. 3 In fact, proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) cited director discretion under Ohio corporate law as the
primary factor for recommending that shareholders reject the
reincorporation proposal. 14 The shareholder vote scheduled for February
2011 was postponed indefinitely because Abercrombie did not have enough
shareholder support to reincorporate in Ohio. 15 Later, in July 2012,
Abercrombie announced a large stock buyback, 16 which further suggests
that Abercrombie's management views its shares as undervalued and may
have intended to buy out shareholders under Ohio law.
Abercrombie's experience shows that Ohio corporate law has reached
an impasse. In a rare market test, the market, through shareholders, has
expressly rejected Ohio corporate law because it limits manager
accountability and firm efficiency. 17 Market rejection indicates that agency
problems between shareholders and management give rise to excessive
costs under Ohio corporate law. 18 Empirical studies also confirm that Ohio
§ 1701.59(F) (West Supp. 2012); discussion infra Part IV.A.2. "Management" is a
term used here to include corporate officers and members of the board.
13 See Davidoff, supra note 4; discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
14 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., Abercrombie & Fitch Co.: Meeting Date 28
February 2011, at 1 (Feb. 8, 2011) ("In view of recent acquisition activity among
apparel retailers, shareholders should scrutinize any attempt to reincorporate in
Ohio. If the company were to reincorporate in Ohio, the directors would have
considerably more control over an acquisition, as well as more certainty regarding
their own legal protection in such a scenario. While we are not aware of any current
discussions regarding a takeover of ANF, the timing of the proposed move and the
absence of a compelling rationale for shareholders raise questions as to the board's
motives."); id. at 4-6 ("On balance, this item does not warrant shareholder support.
The board's recent track record raises serious concerns as to the advisability of
granting it Ohio's expanded authority and legal protection. At the 2009 and 2010
annual meetings, shareholders sent a strong message to the board that change was
needed. The board's response is essentially an offer to trade one poor governance
structure for another.).
15 Tim Feran, Lack of Strong Support Prompts Abercrombie to Delay
Reincorporation Vote, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2011, http://www.dispatch.
com/live/contentbusiness/stories/2011/02/28/abercrombie-postpones-vote-on-
reincorporation.html?sid=l 01; see Abercrombie Not Yet Ready to Be an Ohio
Player, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 28, 2011, 9:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/02/28/abercrombie-not-yet-ready-to-be-an-ohio-player/.
16 James Covert, Le Preppy Pe-Yew: Abercrombie to Hike Buyback as Europe
Slows, N.Y. POST, July 11, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/le_
preppype_yewCYG7XhnaYYfeq4aFMwuPN.
17 Davidoff, supra note 2 (referring to the vote as a "market test"); Proxy
Statement, supra note 3.
18 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1170-73 (1981) ("The
source of the premium is the reduction in agency costs, which makes the firm's
assets worth more in the hands of the acquirer than they were worth in the hands of
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corporations have an unnecessarily high cost of capital.' 9 In other words,
investors in Ohio corporations require a higher interest rate on debt and
provide less capital in return for equity because management has little
accountability to shareholders. Exacerbating this issue, the rise of
institutional investors in recent years has diminished the collective action
problem among shareholders, making shareholder interests in balanced
corporate law more important. 20 Against this background, this article
the firm's managers."); Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, Nevada and the Market
for Corporate Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1165, 1173-74 (2012) (discussing
agency costs in state corporate law).
19 Dale Arthur Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills,
and Who Gets Iced, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 911-13 (1988) (defending the
methodology of the Ryngaert and Netter study); Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry Netter,
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
373, 374 (1988) (stating that stock value of Ohio public companies fell 2%
following the enactment of Ohio antitakeover legislation in 1986); Michael
Ryngaert & Jeffry Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio
Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects, 6 J.L. ECON & ORG. 253 (1990)
[hereinafter Ryngaert & Netter, Revisited] (persuasively supporting methodology
used for their 1986 article). But see Donald Margotta, Thomas McWilliams &
Victoria McWilliams, An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio
Takeover Legislation, 6 J.L. ECON & ORG. 235 (1990) (critically analyzing the
methodology used in the 1986 Ryngaert and Netter article). In addition to the
studies on Ohio antitakeover laws, empirical studies regarding extreme corporate
law in Pennsylvania yielded similar results. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H.
Malatesta, PA Law: State Antitakeover Laws and Stock Prices, 46 FIN. ANALYSTS
J., July-Aug. 1990, at 8; L. Mick Swartz, The 1990 Pennsylvania Antitakeover
Law: Should Firms Opt Out ofAntitakeover Legislation?, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING
& FIN. 223, 223 (1996) (finding a 9% decrease in shareholder returns following the
passage of Pennsylvania antitakeover laws, including a control shareholder
acquisition act, although under less ideal circumstances for empirical study than the
Ryngaert and Netter Ohio study); Samuel J. Szewcyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State
Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of Pennsylvania
Senate Bill 1320, 31 J. FIN. ECoN. 3, 19 (1992) (finding statistically significant
abnormally low shareholder returns for Pennsylvania firms that did not opt-out of
Pennsylvania antitakeover statutes enacted in 1990).
20 D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with
Shareholder Bylaws, 80'FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 131-40 (2011) (discussing the rise
of institutional shareholders); e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1382 (Del. 1995) ("It is generally accepted that proxy contests have re-emerged
with renewed significance as a method of acquiring corporate control because 'the
growth in institutional investment has reduced the dispersion of share ownership."'
(citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1071, 1134 (1990)); see also
Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1861 (stating that management derives less benefit
from extremely protective statues in states like Ohio following the rise of
institutional shareholders in the 1990s).
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analyzes Ohio corporate law, LLC law and securities regulation with a
focus on reforming Ohio law to facilitate investment in Ohio.2'
II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE RACE AND STAKEHOLDER
DEBATES
Underpinning state corporate law are debates regarding the race to
attract corporate charters to a particular jurisdiction and the fundamental
role of businesses in society. The race debate and the stakeholder debate are
related to one another because corporate law defines shareholder power in a
corporation relative to other constituencies (also known as stakeholders),
including management, employees, creditors and suppliers, among others.22
In turn, shareholder power affects how management is held accountable for
their performance and the attractiveness of state corporate law to a
corporation.
Currently, Ohio either does not actively compete for corporate charters
or competes under what is known as "the race to the bottom," which values
management interests over firm efficiency.23 Moreover, Ohio corporate law
does not hold shareholder interests, including profit maximization, over
other constituencies' interests. 24 Contrary to its current position, Ohio
should engage in a limited form of competition for corporate charters to
benefit in-state firms with corporate law that holds directors primarily
responsible to shareholders.
A. The Race Debate
The nature and extent of state competition for corporate law has been
subject to vigorous debate. In the United States, corporations may
incorporate under (i.e. be created by) any states' laws regardless of
21 See discussion infra Parts II-IV. As an important preliminary note, the issues
presented herein are non-exhaustive and are intended primarily to provide
examples to stress the need to revise Title XVII of the Ohio Revised Code.
22 DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 32 (3d ed. 2005)
("The main purposes of corporate law are, first, to legitimize the various
transactions and, second, to specify the role shareholders play when there are major
changes in their firm's capital structure.").
23 David P. Porter, Institutional Investors and Their Role in Corporate
Governance: Reflections by a "Recovering" Corporate Governance Lawyer, 59
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 627, 641-43 (2009) ("In contrast [to states including
Delaware, Nevada and North Dakota], other states [such as Ohio] focus not on
creating a convenient place for foreign incorporators, but to provide a solid
foundation for local businesses .... [Ohio corporate law adopts] statutory
provisions that prevent shareholders from having as much control over the
corporation as perhaps those holders might like or could theoretically enjoy.").
24 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (West Supp. 2012).
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location. Under the internal affairs doctrine, firms are governed by the
laws of their place of incorporation.26 As a result, states may compete to
encourage businesses to incorporate under their laws. Theoretically, states
6 C 27
"sell" corporate law, which firms are free to "purchase" in any state.
Because corporations generally incorporate in their home state or Delaware,
competition for state charters does not constitute each state competing
against forty-nine others for every firm, but rather home states competing
with Delaware for local firms.28 In Ohio, limited competition for firms
located in Ohio will increase firm efficiency and lower the cost of capital,
29
and provide other business and governmental advantages.
Three positions have emerged in the "race debate" to attract corporate
charters: the "race to the top," "the race to the bottom" and a nuanced
intermediary approach. Race to the top advocates argue that states will
provide corporate law that promotes firm efficiency and enhances
shareholder value to compete with one another and attract corporate
charters.3° Race to the bottom advocates, on the other hand, argue that states
will cater to management interests to attract corporate charters because
management heavily influences a firm's incorporation choice.3' In this
view, corporate law will value management interests over firm efficiency,
which casts doubt upon whether corporate law provisions prevalent among
32the states are the most efficient to firm performance.
25 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 30.
26 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) ("The internal affairs doctrine is
a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the
authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the
relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors,
and shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands.").
27 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 396.
28 Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices ofIPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1575 (2002).
29 See discussion infra Part II.
30 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 384; Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's
Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251, 254-55 (1977).
31 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 384; William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 672 (1974).
32 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & AssafHamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553,558
(2002) ("Among other things, we show that our account of state competition
undermines the view that rules produced by state competition should be regarded as
presumptively efficient.").
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A third approach provides a middle ground-that there is a race to the
top for some corporate law provisions and a race to the bottom for others.33
Highlighting the management-shareholder agency problem; explained infra
Part III.A., the third approach argues that there is a race to the bottom only
for those issues that are "significantly redistributive" between management
and shareholders.34 In other words, states will provide laws that favor
management interests to the detriment of firm efficiency when those
corporate laws significantly affect the relationship between management
and shareholders.
Empirical evidence supports the third approach. Uniformity among the
states with regard to most corporate law provisions suggests that states do
race to the top and converge upon efficient and flexible laws where
management and shareholder interests align.35 Where management and
shareholder interests do not align-for example, management self-dealing
transactions, takeover bids and proxy contests-empirical evidence shows
that non-extreme antitakeover provisions are attractive to firms36 but
decrease firm value.37 Extreme antitakeover provisions, on the other hand,
are not more attractive to firms or more successful at securing corporate
charters than typical antitakeover provisions. 38  Instead, extreme
33 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1446 (1992) (citing
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,273-81 (1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZo L. REv. 709, 720-25 (1987)).
34 Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 1441, 1461-62 (defining "significantly redistributive
issues" to involve self-dealing transactions, taking of corporate opportunities
insider trading, takeover bids, proxy contests and transfers between public
shareholders and controlling shareholders).
35 William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715,
736 (1998) ("corporate law has a strong tendency toward uniformity, but ... all
corporate laws are not identical").
36 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 387-88 (noting in hindsight that states may
have lost corporations had they not adopted antitakeover legislation).
37 Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of
Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 856 n.46 (1993) (citing empirical
studies following implementation of antitakeover legislation generally);
Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1872 ("Empirical evidence from the financial
economics literature suggests that anti-takeover statutes reduce shareholder
value.").
38 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1860 ("I find no evidence that companies migrate
to the extreme statutes in the same way that they migrate to some of the typical
statutes; moreover, companies in states with extreme statutes opt out from these
statutes at a higher rate than companies in other states."). But see Bebchuk &
Cohen, supra note 1, at 387-88, 415 ("However, we find no evidence that the
passage of these statutes has hurt the states adopting them in the incorporation
market. Thus, it might be that the antitakeover protections established by
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antitakeover provisions unnecessarily impose costs on firms to decrease
efficiency without the concurrent benefits of attracting talented
management and corporate charters to a particular state.39
Following the middle ground approach in the race debate, Ohio should
maintain common antitakeover provisions and repeal extreme and complex
provisions to support more efficient companies and increase firm value for
Ohio corporations. For example, Ohio should repeal its "anti-staple
statute" 40 which requires potential acquirers to solicit shareholder proxies
separate from tender offers to shareholders. 41 The anti-staple statute has no
practical effect to attract management with increased discretion to manage
corporate affairs, but does impose an unnecessary additional cost-mailing
the proxy and tender offer separately, or using two staples instead of one.4
2
In addition, local attorneys are needed to ensure that businesses comply
with the anti-staple statute and other complex or unique provisions. As a
result, there are unnecessary costs on value-creating business combinations
in Ohio. As will be explained in Part IV, infra, many Ohio laws should be
reformed or repealed to provide clarity and adopt this middle ground
approach in the race debate.
B. The Stakeholder Debate
Underlying Ohio's extreme antitakeover statutes is its stance in the
long-standing stakeholder debate regarding the fundamental role of
businesses in society.43 Corporate law in Ohio and other "constituency
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts do not reach the level that would start
discouraging incorporators."); id. at 415 ("We should caution, however, against
drawing from our findings any firm conclusions with respect to the effects of the
adoption of extreme statutes. The dummy for recapture statute is in fact a dummy.
for Pennsylvania and Ohio, and the staggered board dummy is a dummy for
Massachusetts, and these three states might have some special features other than
having these extreme statutes.").
39 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1860-61.
40 The term "anti-staple statute" is borrowed from Professor Dale Oesterle's class
lectures.
41 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.48(C)(2) (West 2009).
42 Gary P. Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 108, 120 (1983) ("Ordinarily it would be assumed that persons desiring to
sell their shares would also vote for the control share acquisition. However, the
tendering of the shares and the soliciting of the proxies must take place in separate
transactions so that, for example, a letter of transmittal of shares being tendered
could not also serve to appoint a proxy. While this may not appear to impose an
obstacle, the difficulties of reaching and communicating with many thousands of
shareholders will create logistical problems.").
43 See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1148-49 (1932).
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states'4 provide that corporate directors owe a legal duty to act in
shareholders' best interests and also all other constituencies' interests.
These constituencies (or "stakeholders") include not only shareholders, but
also suppliers, creditors, employees, long-term firm interests and society at
large. 45 The purported policy rationale behind constituency statutes is that
corporations should be held accountable to multiple constituencies because
such constituencies have a vested interest in the success of the firm,46 but in
practice these laws instead protect management from shareholder
accountability.
47
1. Multiple Constituencies'Interests: Efficient Markets and
Bargaining Power
Ohio's constituency stance should be replaced with shareholder
primacy principles. 48 As an initial matter, shareholder primacy principles in
fact benefit all constituencies. 49 Because shareholders are residual claimants
on corporate profits, they benefit only after fixed obligations to creditors,
employees and government have already been paid.50 In most situations,
44 As of 1999, forty-one states had adopted statutes permitting directors to consider
non-shareholder interests. Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability
of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a
Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9,28 n.134 (1999) (citing state
constituency statutes).
41 § 1701.59(F).
46 Sarah S. Nickerson, The Sale of Conrail: Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover Statutes
Versus Shareholder Interests, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1369, 1406-09 (1998); see also Kent
Greenfield, Panel 1: Stakeholder Theory and the Relationships Between Host
Communities and Corporations: Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1043, 1043-44 (2008).
47 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 971,996 (1992); George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A
BadIdea Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1129 (2008); Mark J.
Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2491, 2525 (2005) ("[Constituency
statutes'] effect has largely been to give managers a rhetorical basis for opposing
takeovers.").
48 See George Dent, The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Short-
Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 142-48 (2010). But see Margaret Blair & Lynn
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 288-89
(1999).
49 Dent, supra note 47, at 1113-14; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1191
("Maximization of shareholders' wealth ultimately works to the advantage of
workers and suppliers, because shareholders gain only from the firm's mutually
beneficial transactions with those persons.").
50 Dent, supra note 48, at 100 n.6 (2010) (citing literature on shareholders as
residual claimants on corporate profits); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at
1190. But see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 38-41
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shareholder interests are thus aligned with the interests of other
constituencies. 5'
The market for corporate control disciplines management behavior in
conducting corporate affairs through stock price.52 Inefficient management
or management that does not maximize firm value for shareholders and
other investors will cause a firm's stock price to fall.53 When stock price
falls due to mismanagement, there are reduced costs to gain control of the
firm and outside investors may profit by replacing management to improve
efficiency and increase stock price. 54 Management, conscious that a change
in control threatens their job security, will manage corporate affairs in an
efficient manner.5 5 In this way, shareholder primacy in corporate law
creates wealth with management accountability to shareholders.
In recent years, a debate has emerged to challenge market efficiency
and its implications for shareholder primacy in the stakeholder debate.56 As
(2012); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 637, 658-59 (2006).
51 Dent, supra note 47, at 1113-14, 1122-23.
52 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982) ("The incentive the tender
offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock
prices remain high is reduced."); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112-13 (1965); see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 18, at 1187 (providing data that supports the market for
corporate control as a disciplining mechanism because share price of acquired
firms decline steadily prior to tender offers). "The source of the premium is the
reduction in agency costs, which makes the firm's assets worth more in the hands
of the acquirer than they were worth in the hands of the firm's managers." Id. at
1173; see also Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon
Transactions, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 691,696 (2003) ("stock-for-stock transactions
would cancel out irrational pricing to the extent that the market as a whole is
subject to a speculative bubble").
53 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1173-74.
54 Id,
55 Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target
Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L.
REv. 53, 55-56 (1985) (stating that management does have a self interest in job
security, but noting that loyal and conscientious management can provide value to
dispersed shareholders); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1175
(critically noting that management will adopt takeover defenses, not for the best
interests of the firm, but to preserve their individual "salaries and status").
56 For further reading, see the following articles: William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653
(2010); Lawrence Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59
WASH & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002); Lawrence Cunningham, From Random Walks to
Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 559 (1994); Dent, supra note 48;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1165-74; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
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the argument goes, if markets are inefficient, then management should not
manage the firm towards maximizing shareholder value because managing
towards market anomalies will not promote efficient resource allocation. 7
While a full-blown discussion on market efficiency is beyond the scope of
this article, even shareholder primacy critics agree that extreme Ohio
corporate law harms shareholders (i.e. investors).58 Moreover, in light of the
business judgment rule, the legal reform advocated here promotes judicially
enforceable management fiduciary duties limited primarily to the takeover
context.5 9 To the extent that the debate surrounding market efficiency leads
to actual objections with the reform proposed herein, the author invites
future discussion on the topic.
Notwithstanding this debate, U.S. equity markets are widely considered
informationally efficient such that arbitrage opportunities make the market
for corporate control an effective disciplining device.60 In fact, the
disclosure-based model for U.S. securities regulation is based upon the
efficient capital markets hypothesis.61 Many courts, including the U.S.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 14 (1991); Lynn A. Stout,
Corporate Finance: How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH
Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 475
(1997); and Lynn Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: An Introduction to
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003).
57 Michael Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only)
Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 787, 819-23 (2003).
58 Fisch, supra note 50, at 656-57 ("Commentators widely agree that these statutes
harm shareholders by (1) reducing the ability of the takeover market to discipline
management decision-making and (2) making a takeover, with its likely premium
for shareholders, less probable.").
59 The main context in which the Ohio constituency statute should be reconsidered
in favor of shareholder primacy principles (i.e. to maximize shareholder value) is in
takeover situations in which there is an imminent change in the control and
multiple bidders (i.e. the Revlon Zone). See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. Generally,
both shareholder primacy critics and proponents agree that there should an
enforceable duty of loyalty in certain situations. See STOUT, supra note 50, at 81
("corporate law's duty of loyalty has real teeth, and severely limits directors'
discretion to use their corporate powers to enrich themselves").
60 See Dent supra note 48, at 116-17 (noting that investment in research and
development, for example, is positively correlated with stock price); Easterbrook &
Fischel supra note 18, at 1165-66 (discussing the market for corporate control); id.
at 1184 (stating that stock prices reflect long-term consequences).
61 Michael W. Prozan & Michael T. Fatale, Revisiting "Truth in Securities ": The
Use of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 687, 697
(1992); see id. at 693-704 (discussing the origins of disclosure-based U.S.
securities regulation).
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Supreme Court, subscribe to the efficient capital markets hypothesis (i.e.
informational efficiency).62
To be clear, the most widely accepted efficient capital markets
hypothesis is not that markets are perfectly efficient, but rather the "semi-
strong" theory.6 3 There may be situations in which stock price does not
reflect all information, both public and private, then-existing64: for example,
stock price may not accurately reflect firm value when target managers
negotiating changes in corporate control have confidential information
about the firm that is not publicly available.65 As applied to corporate law,
director fiduciary responsibility should be crafted to take into account the
semi-strong efficient markets hypothesis, as will be discussed infra Part
IV.A.2.
Second, constituency statutes are unnecessary because non-shareholder
constituencies may represent their interests by contract.66 Critics argue that
shareholders and management harm absent third parties when negotiating
corporate governance rules.67 So the argument goes, it is impracticable for
these constituencies to expressly contract to represent their numerous
interests.68 The result is implicit agreements with management that are
effectively subordinate to express shareholder agreements. 69 However,
collective bargaining agreements or employment contracts, 7  bond
62 E.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 244, 246 (1988) ("Recent empirical
studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares
traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and,
hence, any material misrepresentations."); Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741,
750 (6th Cir. 1986); In re LTV Securities Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex.
1980) ("the prices of stocks of larger corporations, such as those listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, seem especially efficient").
63 Fama, supra note 9, at 409; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 551; Dale
Arthur Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the
Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 125 (1986); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1432 (1989) (noting that stock price does not reflect non-public information).
64 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 125-26.
65 Id. at 126.
66 Dent, supra note 47, at 1115.
67 E.g., Do Poison Pills Make You Strong?, ECONOMIST (U.S.), June 29, 1991, at
59; see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at 1429-30, 1436-41.
68 Do Poison Pills Make You Strong?, supra note 67.
69 Id.
7 0 But see Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., 897 F.2d 1394, 1399-400 (7th
Cir. 1990) (invalidating an antitakeover device in an employment contract with a
labor union).
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indentures 7 and government contracts are some instances, among others, in
which employees, creditors and society may bargain to represent their
interests in corporate governance. Direct regulation in situations where
there is truly unequal bargaining power, as well as exit options for
constituent interests, are more appropriate remedies for aggrieved third
parties than open-ended corporate law.72
Thus, unequal bargaining power does not adequately explain
shareholder prominence in corporate governance.73 A more plausible
explanation is that shareholders are the constituency willing to pay the
highest premium for corporate control, which also explains why corporate
law reform is material to business formation. 74 Namely, shareholder wealth
declines in constituency jurisdictions and raises the cost of capital, thereby
deterring investment. 75 In sum, constituency statutes that are broadly
applicable to all areas of corporate law are not fit to protect the constituency
groups they purport to protect.
2. Management Protection
More bluntly, constituency statutes are an artifice that caters to
management interests with protection from shareholder accountability.
76
That is, constituency provisions are designed not to benefit non-shareholder
constituencies, but instead to give management nearly unbridled discretion
in managing corporate affairs. 77 Because a duty to all is effectively a duty to
none, it is not clear how a constituency other than shareholders could ever
enforce a corporate director's legal duty.78 In effect, then, constituency
71 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (absolving directors from liability to bondholders absent express
covenants in the bond indenture).
72 Dent, supra note 47, at 1126-28 (arguing that direct regulation is more
appropriate than imposing corporate fiduciary duties in situations where there is
truly unequal bargaining power); id at 1136 (identifying exit options in
negotiations situations).73 See id at 1134-37.
74 See id. at 1120-21.
75 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1830; see also Dent, supra note 47, at 1121;
Romano, supra note 37, at 856 n.46.
76 Bainbridge, supra note 47, at 996; Dent, supra note 47, at 1129. But see Porter,
supra note 23, at 639-40, 679-8 1.
77 See Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with
Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 966-67 (2008).
78 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1190-92 ("A manager responsible to
two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither."); see also Roe, supra note
47, at 2525-26 (citing a failed legislative proposal in CA to provide non-
shareholder constituencies with a cause of action against corporate directors); Ryan
J. York, Comment, Visages Of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency
Anti-Takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market for Corporate
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statutes severely limit the potency with which corporate law holds
management accountable for poor performance or misconduct.
Still, shareholder primacy critics argue that management discretion
encourages management to enter into value-creating deals and also to
attract talented management with the prospect of limiting shareholder
derivative litigation. 79 Eliminating fiduciary duties, however, is not in the
best interest of the corporation for several reasons: excessive director
discretion decreases shareholder wealth and raises the cost of capital;
reincorporation in Ohio is deterred because it signals to the market that
80
management is inefficient; and relaxed duties invite director misconduct.
Moreover, alternatives to eliminating fiduciary duties under
constituency statutes are available if these provisions are desirable to some
firms. Ordinary rather than extreme legislation similarly attracts
management to adopt state corporate law. Also, rather than effectively
eliminating fiduciary duties, laws may be written to enable corporations to
amend fiduciary duties if desired.8'
As will be explained in detail, infra Part IV.A, Ohio's constituency
stance in the stakeholder debate reflects a race to the bottom which should
be abandoned in favor of shareholder primacy principles. As the leader in
corporate law, Delaware has had great success attracting efficient firms
with corporate law that reflects shareholder primacy principles.82 Further,
the constituency view raises the cost of capital to Ohio firms, 83 reduces
efficiency and excessively caters to management interests by limiting their
accountability to shareholders.
Control, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 195-96 (2002) (citing and summarizing
Abrahamson v. Waddell, 624 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1992)). Moreover, if a
jurisdiction gave a non-shareholder constituency a seat on the board of directors,
which no U.S. state requires, it is not clear how we would assign board seats among
all constituencies. Dent, supra note 47, at 1118.
79 See Romano, supra note 37, at 847-50; see also Ryngaert & Netter, supra note
19, at 376.
80 See discussion infra Part IV.A; see also Romano, supra note 37, at 850-51.
81 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2010); see also Angus Loten,
With New Law, Profits Take a Back Seat, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577168591470161630.html?mod =
WSJbusinessLeftSecondHighlights.
82 In Delaware, directors are required to act in the best interests of shareholders
rather than to benefit divergent constituency interests. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). Professor Stout argues
that shareholder primacy principles in Delaware are limited to the takeover context,
but recent Delaware cases have refuted this position. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 163, 169-72 (2008).
83 See Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 376.
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Abercrombie's recent experience attempting to reincorporate is
particularly insightful in this regard because it shows that Ohio's extreme
stance of catering to management interests at shareholder expense does not
make Ohio an attractive reincorporation choice.84 Moreover, the
Abercrombie experience suggests that market prices do take corporate law
provisions into account because shareholders took Ohio corporate law into
account when voting on reincorporation.85 In sum, to adopt positions in the
race and stakeholder debates that benefit Ohio businesses, Ohio should
reform its corporate law to be less complex and extreme. Whereas the
present section provides a foundation in theory, Part III next turns to
practical reasons for reforming Ohio corporate law.
III. REFORMING OHIO CORPORATE LAW: PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Ohio should engage in limited competition with Delaware to
incorporate in-state firms under Ohio law. To be clear, Ohio does not need
to engage in competition with Delaware to be the leader in corporate law in
order to materially benefit from reform. The primary benefit to making
Ohio an attractive incorporation choice is not tax related, but rather
lowering the cost of capital to in-state firms and encouraging investment in
Ohio.86 Moreover, simply providing statutory clarity and flexibility to
change statutory default rules can limit agency costs and the inefficiency
associated with mandatory rules (i.e. higher cost of capital).87 With these
modest objectives, Ohio should focus on limited competition with Delaware
to incorporate Ohio-based firms in Ohio. This section will explain (1)
political problems with Ohio corporate law reform; (2) how reform will
benefit Ohio businesses and government; and (3) why Ohio should engage
in limited reform targeting local investment and firms located in Ohio.
84 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-6; see also Abercrombie Not
Yet Ready to Be an Ohio Player, supra note 15.
85 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-6; see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.86 See Dent, supra note 47, at 1129; Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 376.
87 Winter, supra note 30, at 259 ("But substituting a mandatory legal rule for
bargaining also may impose a cost in the form of the elimination of alternatives
which the parties might prefer."); see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1174
(discussing agency costs and noting that "[i]n short, the efficiency of state
corporate law depends on its marginal costs and benefits in controlling agent
cheating given other constraints on agency costs"); Larry E. Ribstein, From
Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L..REv. 363, 390-91
(2003) ("Contractual choice of law provides exit from state laws that would
otherwise impose costs on the parties. This avoidance function of choice-of-law
clauses matters most regarding mandatory rules that cannot cheaply be avoided by
simply drafting alternative contact provisions.").
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A. Private Incentives and Ohio Corporate Law Politics
Management and attorneys are the two major interest groups that may
make it difficult to strike an appropriate balance between management and
shareholder interests when drafting corporate law. 88 These special interests
are particularly important because they heavily influence firm incorporation
decisions and may have interests that diverge from shareholder interests.
8 9
Moreover, these interests lead to litigation costs regarding agency issues
and other professional services costs that are associated with inefficient
corporate law.
90
First, management interests may be an obstacle to efficient corporate
law if mandatory rules limit firm flexibility to choose charter provisions
and bylaws. Corporate law is designed to address agency problems that
exist among shareholders and management when their interests do not
align.91 Traditionally, shareholders and other investors (e.g., creditors)
passively provide capital to represent their interests. 9' In addition to a
passive role in corporate governance, shareholders often do not vote in the
applicable jurisdiction or otherwise directly voice their interests in the
legislative process.93
By contrast, management plays a more active role in corporate
governance, and may pursue self-interests, including job security and
88 Carney, supra note 35, at 717-18; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 705-06 (2002).
89 Daines, supra note 28, at 1586 ("Romano found that reincorporation decisions
were typically motivated by lawyers rather than managers." (citing Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 225, 274 (1985))); Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1 (noting management
influence on incorporation decisions); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at
1420.
90 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 504-05 (1987) (noting the
litigation fees and advisory expenses associated with corporate governance).
9' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1170; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-11 (1976); see also Romano, supra note 37, at
843 (stating that there is an agency problem among management and shareholders
when their interests do not align).
92 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1171; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 654 (1999)
("shareholders seem the classic example of Mancur Olson's 'inchoate group,'
namely, a group that, although large in number, is not well organized and hence has
less ability to influence political decisions than smaller but better organized groups
such as labor or corporate managers" (emphasis added)).
93 See Coffee, supra note 92, at 656.
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limited personal liability, that do not align with investor interests.94 In the
political sphere, management may lobby legislatures to directly affect the
political process, especially if their attorneys are involved in the legislative
drafting process. 95 In their more active role, manager interests may drown
out diffuse shareholders' interests and voice in corporate governance absent
a neutral legal environment.
96
Because corporate law is designed in large part to remedy this agency
problem, corporate law is most important where shareholder and
management interests diverge, which will be the subject of the statutory
analysis infra Part V.A. These provisions should provide neutral default
rules that take both management and shareholder interests into account, are
clear in application, and are discretionary such that firms may contract
around them.97 If discretionary default rules provide management with
alternatives to pursue their interests outside the legislative process, the
threat that management poses to efficient and flexible corporate law is
diminished.98 With discretionary default rules, management may seek to
change corporate charters and bylaws away from statutory default rules
rather than affect the legislative process.99
To be sure, Ohio corporate law excessively supports management
interests to the detriment of shareholder interests and the overall business
environment. 00  Some fiduciary duty provisions, for example, are
94 Carney, supra note 35, at 750-51 tbl.3. For example, management sponsored
antitakeover legislation in the 1980's. Id. In Ohio, for example, Goodyear Tire was
a major corporate proponent of antitakeover legislation. Id.
95 Id. at 750.
96 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1171 (discussing the shareholder
collective action problem); see, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 592-
93; Davidoff, supra note 4 (noting that Abercrombie's recent attempt to
reincorporate in Ohio may have furthered management interests which are not
necessarily in line with shareholder interests); see also Coffee, supra note 92, at
647 (stating that one theory posits "that shareholder dispersion depends on the
ability of the legal system to protect minority shareholders").
97 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 739-41 (noting that corporate law that avoids
litigation and strikes a real balance between management and shareholders is
attractive to firms); Winter, supra note 30, at 259 (noting that mandatory rules may
impose costs on firms).
98 See Camey, supra note 35, at 728 ("[M]anagement's interest in general matters
of state corporate law will be less intense than that of the bar."); see, e.g., Macey &
Miller, supra note 90, at 521-22 (noting that poison pills can serve management
interests outside the legislative process).
99 Camey, supra note 35, at 728. Another alternative to management lobbying the
legislature to achieve its interests is incorporation in another jurisdiction.
100 See discussion infra Part IV; see, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4 (noting potentially
misaligned interests between Abercrombie's management and shareholders under
Ohio corporate law).
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effectively non-existent and Ohio's six antitakeover statutes, taken together,
are extreme.' 0 ' Further, some discretionary provisions do not have neutral
default rules. 10 2 As a result, Ohio managers have significant discretion to
advance their interests and reduce competitive pressure to run an efficient
company.
Second, local attorneys have incentives not to advocate efficient and
flexible laws that increase and retain incorporations.'0 3 While local
attorneys benefit from increasing local incorporations because of a larger
legal market, they do not benefit if attorneys from other jurisdictions are
also attracted to the larger market. 1°4 As a result, they may advocate
complex legal rules that differ with competing jurisdictions-like
Delaware-as a barrier to entry for out-of-state attorneys.'0 5 Similarly, local
attorneys may not be interested in legal rules that increase incorporations in
the long run because new attorneys may enter the market during that
time. 10 6 In addition, a free-rider problem may discourage local attorneys
from investing time in drafting legislation to increase incorporations and the
size of the market for legal services. 0 7 That is, other attorneys will benefit
from the considerable time and effort that is required to draft and
consistently update corporate law.
Indeed, Ohio legislators depend on the Ohio State Bar Association for
input into the legislative drafting process, 10 8 and difficult to understand
Ohio law likely places a premium on local attorneys' services. The
Delaware Bar has similarly been identified as an interest group that may
'0' See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
102 E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2012) (firms must opt
out of the heightened business judgment rule for damages); see discussion infra
Part IV.A.2.
103 Camey, supra note 35, at 717-18, 720-21.
lO4 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 605-06.
105 See id.
116 ld. at 705.
10' Id. at 706.
108 One practitioner of Ohio corporate law has commented on the Ohio legislative
process for corporate law:
A simple amendment to section 1701.55 was processed in the
ordinary course through the Ohio State Bar Association
machinery and a sponsor found in the Legislature. As far as I
know, there was no opposition to this amendment when it was
introduced as House Bill 134 and enacted in 2007 .... While I
disagree with that viewpoint, as the Corporation Law
Committee's comments actually reflected the consensus view of
the leading Ohio corporate law experts about Ohio law at that
time, it hardly matters. The law today is what the statute says it
is.
Porter, supra note 23, at 664-65 (emphasis added).
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advocate complex statutes and legal rules that increase demand and fees for
local attomeys. 10 9 Therefore, it may be necessary to include additional
parties in drafting Ohio corporate law. In light of its extreme and complex
nature, and the special interests identified here, Ohio corporate law is
consistent with private interests affecting the law.
B. State Competition for Corporate Charters Matters
Ohio should compete for corporate charters with laws that are attractive
to both managers and shareholders. Among other firm benefits, corporate
law reform in Ohio will increase firm efficiency and lower the cost of
capital to firms incorporating under Ohio law."0 In addition, reform will
provide collective benefits to Ohioans and Ohio government.
Notwithstanding these benefits, the case for reforming Ohio corporate
law should not be overstated: making Ohio an attractive incorporation
choice is more likely to attract a firm's corporate headquarters than
manufacturing centers, customer service centers, warehouses and retail
locations. Even firms incorporated under Ohio laws could locate their
headquarters outside Ohio. To demonstrate that incorporation in a particular
jurisdiction is distinct from other decision-making, consider that Eaton
Corp., formerly an Ohio company, recently reincorporated in Ireland for tax
reasons, but plans to keep factories, offices and other operations in the
United States.1 '
1. Lowering the Cost of Capital to Ohio Businesses
Corporate laws that recognize investor interests are needed to lower the
cost of capital to Ohio firms. Because investors provide capital, legal
reforms to promote management accountability to shareholders will remedy
agency problems between management and shareholders under extreme
109 Macey & Miller, supra note 90, at 503-05 ("Delaware could stimulate litigation
by supplying legal rules that are unclear in application. The bar therefore has some
interest in reducing the clarity of Delaware law to enhance the amount of
litigation.").
110 Professor John Coffee argues that law matters because a jurisdiction's legal
system must protect public or minority investors before liquid securities markets
will effectively monitor management with share prices that indicate either firm
efficiency or mismanagement. See Coffee, supra note 92, at 644-47 ("The most
convincing explanation [for the correlation between liquid equity markets in the
United States and United Kingdom, but not other countries] ... is that only those
legal systems that provide significant protections for minority shareholders can
develop active equity markets.").
1 1 John D. McKinnon & Scott Thurm, U.S. Firms Move Abroad to Cut Taxes,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000087239639044
4230504577615232602107536.html.
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Ohio corporate law. 112 Taking shareholder interests into account will attract
capital because investors will require a smaller premium to compensate
them for limited representation in corporate governance." 3 In turn,
businesses benefit from and are attracted to an environment where it is less
expensive to raise capital. 14 Put differently, access to capital is an incentive
to conduct business in Ohio that is poorly implemented under Ohio
corporate law and thus warrants thoughtful discussion.
Empirical data show that it is unnecessarily expensive for businesses to
raise capital under Ohio law. Following the enactment of Ohio antitakeover
legislation in 1986, event studies found a 2% decrease in the stock value of
Ohio corporations.' 15 Additional empirical evidence shows decreases in
shareholder wealth following enactment of antitakeover legislation in other
states.' 16 Lower stock prices reflect that Ohio law reduces the takeover
premium inherent in stock value. 17 Specifically, as management has
considerably more discretion under Ohio law than under comparative law,
there is less risk of a corporate takeover that would otherwise enhance stock
value due to efficiency gains and the premium paid to shareholders during
acquisitions.' 8 Significantly, lower market stock price and market
capitalization for Ohio companies represents a higher cost of raising capital
and generating business activity. The higher cost of capital referenced here
112 See Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 18, at 1170-73; Kobayashi & Ribstein,
supra note 18, at 1174.
113 Coffee, supra note 92, at 698 ("In addition, legal rules in both the United States
and the United Kingdom protect the dispersed shareholder from the 'creeping'
acquisition of control without the payment of a control premium." (emphasis
added)); see also Dent, supra note 47, at 1121.
114 Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 18, at 1173; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
18, at 1167, 1172-74 ("In other words, managers must pay investors for permission
to cheat them.").
15 Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 374; Ryngaert & Netter, Revisited, supra
note 19, at 253 (supporting methodology used for their 1986 article); Oesterle,
supra note 19, at 911-13 (supporting methodology). But see Margotta, McWilliams
& McWilliams, supra note 19, at 235 (1990) (critically analyzing the methodology
used in the 1986 Ryngaert and Netter article).
116 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 387 (stating in hindsight that states may
have lost corporations had they not adopted antitakeover legislation); Romano,
supra note 37, at 856 n.46 (citing empirical studies following implementation of
antitakeover legislation generally).
117 Romano, supra note 37, at 843 n.46 (citing studies); Subramanian, supra note 1,
at 1827-30 (stating that empirical studies show stock value decreases following the
adoption of antitakeover statutes and that virtually all academic commentators
agree that antitakeover statutes decrease shareholder value).
'18 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1827-30.
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includes lower-valued equity and higher borrowing costs (e.g., higher
interest rates) incurred in debt markets. " 9
Aside from the higher cost of capital, Ohio corporate law inflicts other
unnecessary expenses upon Ohio businesses as well. First, Ohio's complex
and unique corporate law essentially requires Ohio corporations to hire
lawyers with expertise in Ohio law. Exacerbating the legal cost is the
likelihood that businesses may want to opt out of unconventional Ohio
default rules, such as the shareholder voting provisions.12 By contrast,
more typical corporate law subjects local lawyers to competition with
corporate lawyers in other jurisdictions and potentially drives down legal
expenses. 121 Second, and related to the corporate law context, excessive
state securities regulation causes Ohio businesses to incur unnecessary
expenses, including transaction costs, when raising capital. 22 Because of
these expenses, Ohio should reform corporate law and securities regulation
to lower the cost of doing business in-state.
123
In the alternative, if Ohio corporations opt out of Ohio law with
incorporation in Delaware, still other costs are inflicted upon businesses
located in Ohio. 124 First, Ohio-based corporations incorporated in Delaware
are effectively taxed twice. 125 That is, such corporations are burdened with
Ohio's gross receipts tax (the Commercial Activities Tax) in addition to
119 Conversely, if a firm's capital structure is adjusted to provide for more or less
equity relative to debt, the cost of equity capital is inversely related to the cost of
debt capital. Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 650 (1973).
120 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
121 Carney, supra note 35, at 721 (stating that lawyers may make litigation more
costly "by creating some amount of market power over advising and litigating
under a set of corporate laws").
122 Cf Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789,
857 (2002) ("Complicated legal environments in which multiple jurisdictions or
vertically related authorities regulate the same subject raise like transitional
concerns. When, for example, a field is subject to comprehensive state, national,
and international regulation (in, say, intellectual property law), large-scale reform
at any level without careful accommodation is likely to risk severe legal transition
costs.").
123 See discussion infra Part IV.A (corporations); Part 1V.B (LLCs); Part IV.C
(securities regulation).
124 Several statistics indicate that Delaware is Ohio's main competitor for corporate
law. First, 97% of all companies incorporate in either their home state or Delaware.
Daines, supra note 28, at 1562. Second, 95% of all companies that do not
incorporate in their home state incorporate in Delaware. Id. at 1563. Third, nearly
70% of all companies going public incorporate in Delaware. Id.
125 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 573 (Delaware franchise tax).
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Delaware franchise taxes. 26 By contrast, a manufacturing corporation
incorporated in Ohio is subject to Ohio's Commercial Activities Tax, but
avoids Delaware's franchise tax. 27 This result cuts against Ohio's tax
policy to attract manufacturing businesses by replacing its corporate
franchise tax and personal property tax with a gross receipts tax limited to
in-state revenue.
28
Second, Ohio based companies incorporated in Delaware are subject to
litigation in Delaware' 29 The prospect of traveling to Delaware for legal
defense and hiring local legal counsel is a potentially large cost that could
make opting out of Ohio law prohibitively expensive. 30 To avoid forcing
businesses to incur the costs of either Ohio incorporation or out-of-state
incorporation, Ohio should revise Ohio corporate law to make Ohio
incorporation a neutral and attractive choice.
2. Governmental Advantages
Corporate law affects a firm's incorporation choice and consequently
benefits states that adopt attractive corporate law.' 3' Delaware has
established itself as the dominant leader in incorporation choice because it
offers (1) a specialized Chancery Court 32 with expedited proceedings and
no jury trials; (2) case law that provides certainty133 and is understood
126 DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2009 DELAWARE ANNUAL REPORT 1 (noting Division of
Corporations revenue from business entity taxes and other fees).
127 Corporation Franchise Tax, OHIO DEP'T OF TAXATION, 2010, at 42. Notably,
Abercrombie's proposed reincorporation in Ohio would have saved the company
$180,000 in tax liability. ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-6;
Davidoff, supra note 4.
128 April Butler, Comment: A Look at What the Cat Dragged in: The Problems
Inherent in Ohio's Commercial Activity Tax, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 99, 107
(2006).
129 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 573.
130 See Macey & Miller, supra note 90, at 504-05 (noting that the Delaware
corporate bar is likely to favor laws that increase demand for local legal services).
131 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 383; see Subramanian, supra note 1, at
1795.
132 Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV (Del.
Dep't of State Div. of Corps.), 2007, at 5-7.
133 One Ohio practitioner has argued that Ohio corporate law is more certain than
Delaware law. Feran, supra note 10 ("But the fact is, Ohio law isn't drastically
different from Delaware law-except for the fact that it's certain." (quoting John
Beavers)). However, Former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court William
Rehnquist spoke very highly of the certainty provided by the Delaware Chancery
Courts:
[S]ince the turn of the century, it has handed down thousands of
opinions interpreting virtually every provision of Delaware's
corporate law statute. No other state court can make such a claim
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throughout the business community as predicable for business planning;
13 4
(3) expert judges to apply that law in litigation and optional mediation;13 1
(4) an engaged corporate law bar that is heavily relied upon for annual
review of the Delaware General Corporate Law and has agreed to leave its
self-interests behind; 36 and (5) quality service from the Delaware Secretary
of State's Office. 137 While competition with Delaware as the leader in state
corporate law is a questionable goal, 38 limited and inexpensive Ohio
reform is a practical goal that will benefit the local economy and preserve
some governmental revenue Delaware currently imports from Ohio.
i. State Incorporation Rates and Revenue Data
As the leading provider of corporate law, Delaware incorporated 63%
of all Fortune 500 companies and 879,000 business entities in total in
2009.139 Generally, Delaware accounts for more than half of all U.S.
corporations. 4 ° As a result, Delaware enjoys substantial financial benefits
including tax revenue, filing fees and property that escheats to the state.'
4
'
In 2011, Delaware amassed $614 million in franchise fees and taxes, $83
million in filing fees and $428 million in escheated property,' 42 which
totaled about 32% of its general revenue fund.
143
.... Perhaps most importantly, practitioners recognize that
"[o]utside the takeover process.., most Delaware corporations
do not find themselves in litigation. The process of decision in
the litigated cases has so refined the law, that business planners
may usually order their affairs to avoid law suits."
Black, supra note 132, at 6.
134 Black, supra note 132, at 8.
135 Id.; Chancellor William Chandler, Del. Chancery Court, Schottenstein Zox and
Dunn Distinguished Practitioners in Residency Program: Fiduciary Responsibilities
Course at the Moritz College of Law (Mar. 18-20, 2011). Chancellor Chandler also
noted in class that Delaware judges are available to provide mediation services to
Delaware corporations.
136 Black, supra note 132, at 4-5.
131 Id. at 9.
138 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 612 (citing a potential federal
charter as the biggest threat to Delaware's dominance). See generally Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REv. 125, 146 (2009).
139 DEL. D1v. OF CORPS., supra note 126, at 1.
140 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 389.
141 See DEL. Div. OF CORPS., supra note 126, at 2 (providing data regarding revenue
from taxes and other fees).
142 DEL. DEP'T FIN., DELAwARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK 29 (2011).
143 See id.
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Ohio, on the other hand, incorporates 1-2% of U.S. corporations,
representing 54% of Ohio-based companies, 44 and increasing the volume
of businesses incorporated in Ohio stands to benefit the State. Ohio's
comparatively high incorporation rate among Ohio-based companies,
however, should not be attributed to its pro-management provisions because
Ohio's incorporation rate fell slightly following the pro-management 1986
amendments.1 45 Because there is a home state advantage to incorporation
choice,146 the high incorporation rate may reflect Ohio's rich business
history rather than desirable corporate law. In light of a more recent decline,
a high incorporation rate does not affect Ohio's difficulties in attracting,
retaining and growing businesses. 47 In this regard, Abercrombie's failed
attempt to reincorporate in Ohio is particularly important because it
provides evidence that Ohio corporate law can have a detrimental impact on
a business with close ties to Ohio,' 48 even in the presence of tax benefits
under Ohio law. 149 A more advantageous corporate law framework will
work in conjunction with Ohio's resources to facilitate in-state investment.
It is difficult to quantify the governmental benefits of businesses
incorporating in Ohio, rather than Delaware, because of differing tax
structures in each state. Both states impose privilege-of-doing-business
taxes and filing fees, but the scope of these taxes differs greatly in each
144 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Alan Ferrell, Does the Evidence Support State
Competition in Corporate Law? 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1812 (2002).
145 See Daines, supra note 28, at 1607; see also Subramanian, supra note 1, at
1860-61. While the evidence presented here is generally consistent with a race to
the bottom, I also present evidence suggesting some limits on this view. Managers
migrate to states with typical antitakeover statutes, but not to the three states with
severe antitakeover statutes-Massachusetts, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Id.
146 See Daines, supra note 28, at 1562 ("home-state bias").
147 For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data as of this
writing, in December 2010, 300,000 fewer Ohioans were employed than in
December 2000. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST39000003 (select "From: 2000" and "To:
2010" in "Change Output Options"); see also Tom Feran, Gov. John Kasich Says
Only California and Michigan Lost More Jobs Than Ohio in the Last Decade,
PLAIN DEALER POLITIFACT OHIO (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.politifact.
com/ohio/statements/201 1/mar/04/john-kasich/gov-john-kasich-says-only-
califomia-and-michigan-/.
148 "In 1996, The Limited spun off Abercrombie, which has about 600 stores and
22,000 employees." Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/
17/national/17STOR.html.
149 Abercrombie stood to save $180,000 per year under Ohio law. ISS PROXY
ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-6; Davidoff, supra note 4.
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state. 150 For example, in Ohio there is a heavier dependence on the
Commercial Activity Tax, which does not depend on a firm's place of
incorporation, than other taxes.' 5' Notwithstanding this difficulty, increased
Ohio incorporation unquestionably provides at least some governmental
revenue from escheated property and filing fees.' 52 Moreover, promoting
Ohio incorporation is beneficial to promote small business development
and strengthen existing businesses' ties to Ohio.'53 Accordingly, Ohio
should undertake legal reform in this area to promote state interests.
ii. Ohio 's Interest in Propelling the Local Economy
Providing Ohio-based companies with an attractive option to
incorporate in-state, rather than in Delaware, may propel business growth
with lower investment costs. If Ohio positions itself as an attractive option
for incorporation, businesses may avoid both the current costs associated
with Ohio law and the costs of incorporating in Delaware. The government
may promote its interest in propelling the local economy with a friendly
business climate that attracts investment capital.
C. Ohio Should Engage in Limited Competition for Corporate
Charters
Ohio should engage in limited competition to encourage firms located
in Ohio to incorporate in Ohio. Again, firms incorporated in Ohio will
materially benefit from Ohio reform with a lower cost of capital reflecting
reduced agency costs, 154 even if direct government benefits (e.g., tax
revenue and property escheating to the state) are uncertain and firms
incorporated in Ohio may locate facilities outside Ohio. In fact, merely
providing statutory clarity and discretionary default rules that provide
flexibility may limit agency costs and professional services costs. 155 And in
"' Kail M. Padgitt, 2011 State Business Tax Climate Index, BACKGROUND PAPER
(Tax Found. Wash. D.C.), Oct. 2010, at 41-42; see also Corporation Franchise
Tax, supra note 127, at 45-46.
151 Butler, supra note 128, at 106-07.
152 Some scholars appropriately question whether government revenue is a material
benefit of increasing local incorporations. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at
728-29. However, as noted throughout, other benefits including lower cost of
capital are present to attract investors and improve Ohio's business climate.
153 E.g., ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-6 (Abercrombie cited
strengthening its ties with Ohio as a reason for reincorporation in Ohio).
'54 Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 18, at 1174; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
18, at 1173-74.
155 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1174; Winter, supra note 30, at 259;
see Ribstein, supra note 87, at 390-91.
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addition to substantive law, other factors surrounding Ohio's legal
environment of business are important to attracting corporate charters.
156
While Delaware reaps considerable benefits as the leader in U.S.
corporate law, there are several barriers to entry that discourage vigorous
competition from other states. Nonetheless, due to a home-state bias for
incorporations that gives states an edge when competing for in-state
firms,157 states may compete for in-state firms without challenging
Delaware's position as the leader in state corporate law. It is the home-state
bias and targeted competition to incorporate local firms in Ohio that
provides the link between incorporation and the benefit to Ohio's business
environment. This section will explain both deterrents to challenging
Delaware as the leader for state corporate law and why Ohio should pursue
limited competition for corporate charters, targeting in-state firms.
1. Deterrents to Competing with Delaware for Corporate
Charters
There are several factors deterring other states from competing with
Delaware as the leader in state corporate law. 158 First, "network
externalities" make competition with Delaware difficult. Network
externalities in corporate law arise from both "interpretive externalities"
and "legal service externalities." 159 Interpretive externalities benefit
Delaware case law because its many diverse firms provide vast
opportunities through litigation for Delaware courts to address current
corporate law issues in a timely manner. 160 Legal service externalities
benefit Delaware because many lawyers specialize in Delaware corporate
law, therefore creating market competition to lower legal services expenses
associated with obtaining information.
16 1
Second, Delaware has corporate law infrastructure, which would
require competing states to make significant up-front investment in
infrastructure to compete. Because of expert courts and judges, the
excellent service its Secretary of State's Office provides and a vast legal
156 Daies, supra note 28, at 1566-67; see discussion supra Part III.B.
157 Dames, supra note 28, at 1562, 1575; see also Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1,
at 387.
158 In fact, competing with Delaware is so difficult that some commentators suggest
only a federal charter could compete with Delaware. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 32, at 613 ("[federal] competitor might add substantially to the competitive
threat facing Delaware"); Roe, supra note 138, at 148-49.
159 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 586 (citing Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757,
843-44 (1995)).
160 Id. at 586-87.
161 Id.; see also Black, supra note 132, at 7-8.
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services infrastructure, Delaware is well-positioned as the state leader in
corporate law. 162 Other states do not have this infrastructure and would
need to make considerable up-front investment, constituting sunk costs, to
attempt to compete with Delaware.163
Third, states are not able to compete with price competition for
corporate charters. 164 Price competition is only effective among products
with similar quality, which is not the case with corporate law.' 65 In addition,
providing reduced franchise fees to attract corporate charters is not likely to
be effective among large publicly-traded firms because franchise fees are
usually insignificant relative to firm value. 66 Similarly, franchise fees do
not provide significant revenues to state governments. 1
67
Finally, Delaware may simply react to other states threatening to
challenge them in the race for corporate charters. If another state developed
an innovative corporate law provision, for example, Delaware could simply
provide law mirroring that provision or otherwise addressing a c urrent issue
to maintain its leading position. 68 For the foregoing reasons, there are
significant obstacles to challenging Delaware's leading position in the
market for corporate law. 1
69
2. Ohio's Limited Form of Competition
Notwithstanding Delaware's seemingly insurmountable lead in the
market for corporate law, Ohio should compete to have firms located in
Ohio incorporate in Ohio. The bias local firms have for their home state
provides a good reason for states to compete for those local firms.70 Ohio
has a particularly strong basis for engaging in this limited form of
competition because its corporate law is currently so complex, extreme and
has not been shown to attract charters more so than more typical statutes
162 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 586-88.
163 See id
'64 Id. at 589-90.
165 I[d.
166 Id. at 590 (citing Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the
Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1225 (2001)).167 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 688-89.
168 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 593-95.
169 Scholars recognize that Delaware's dominance is generally secure, but not
insurmountable. E.g., id at 586 ("It is worth stressing that the structural features
analyzed below do not absolutely rule out any future challenge to Delaware's
dominance by another state."); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 724-25 ("Even
absent a change in economic fundamentals, it is entirely plausible that an
enterprising governor will in the future revamp her state's corporate law, establish
a specialized court, and go after a portion of Delaware's profits.").
170 Daines, supra note 28, at 1562; see also Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at
387.
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catering to management interests.' 71 In fact, leading corporate law scholars
have "blacklisted Ohio as extreme.' 72 As will be explained in Part IV,
Ohio indeed has excessive antitakeover regulation as well as other statutes
that are extreme and drafted in a complex manner.
Ohio should compete for in-state firms because Ohio incorporation will
lower the cost of capital to Ohio firms and promote efficient companies,'
which is a benefit that does not require competing with Delaware to be the
dominant state for corporate charters. Again, Abercrombie's recent attempt
to reincorporate in Ohio is strong evidence that Ohio corporate law is
materially harming Ohio's business environment with excessive
management protection: Abercrombie is an Ohio-based company that failed
to incorporate in Ohio because of Ohio corporate law. Moreover, such
evidence is rare because firms rarely attempt to reincorporate in Ohio. The
author is aware of only one other instance in which a firm attempted to
reincorporate in Ohio since Ohio adopted its 1986 reforms: Scotts, Inc.
successfully reincorporated from Delaware to Ohio in 1994.114 The fact that
firms rarely reincorporate in Ohio cuts against arguments that Ohio is a
desirable incorporation choice. Part III demonstrated that there is reason for
Ohio to engage in limited competition for corporate charters; Part IV will
build upon that with proposed resolutions to specific statutory issues under
Ohio corporate law.
V. ANALYZING STATUTORY ISSUES IN TITLE XVII OF THE OHIO
REVISED CODE
Specific statutory issues persist throughout Title XVII of the Ohio
Revised Code for corporate law and securities regulation. In many
instances, laws are either unnecessarily complex, lack policy rationale or
both. Some terminology, for example, dates back to 1927 and lacks policy
rationale as an outlier from comparative state corporate law. 75 The rules of
a corporation are called "regulations" in Ohio despite being called "bylaws"
171 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1860-61.
172 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 387; see Robert Daines, Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 546 (2001).
173 See Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 376.
174 The Scotts Co., Proxy Statement for Special Meeting of Stockholders (Form 10-
K/A) (Sept. 20, 1994); The Scotts Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (Sept. 30,
1995) ("On September 20, 1994, the shareholders voted to reincorporate Scotts
from Delaware to Ohio.").
175 Ohio adopted a general corporation law in 1927. General Corporation Act, No.
11, 1927 Ohio Laws 9. The terms "regulation" and "bylaw" persist today under the
same meaning they carried under the 1927 general corporate law. Compare id
§ 8623-12, with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.11 (West 2009) (defining
regulations); compare § 8623-61, with § 1701.59(A) (defining bylaws).
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in the vast majority of jurisdictions. 76 By contrast, Ohio "bylaws" are
specific rules that affect board of director duties.
177
But the provisions that are most important to shareholder wealth, the
cost of capital and firms' decisions where to incorporate address the
relationship between shareholders and management because corporate law
is designed to address agency costs. 178 In fact, agency costs are so important
that business combinations primarily create value by reducing agency
costs. 179 Specific provisions addressing the management-shareholder
relationship include antitakeover, fiduciary duty and shareholder voting
provisions.'"
In addition to substantive default provisions that strike a balance
between management and shareholder interests, corporate law should
provide clarity and, in many instances, discretion to change charter
provisions and bylaws.' 81 Mandatory rules constrain firms with high agency
costs, where, for example, shareholders prefer alternatives to antitakeover
statutes for monitoring management in change of control situations, perhaps
due to the nature of the firm.'82 Also, statutory complexity gives rise to
professional services costs, including legal fees that may otherwise be
avoided. 183 With this focus, Ohio should adopt less complex statutes and
revisit policy discussions regarding corporations, LLCs and securities
regulation.
A. Corporations-Chapter 1701
Ohio's general corporation law should be revised to provide a cohesive
balance between management and shareholder interests. Ohio corporate law
is founded upon a very dated structure that has since been consistently
amended to accommodate management interests. Unfortunately, the
resultant patchwork structure lacks cohesion and is difficult to understand
176 § 1701.11.
177 § 1701.59(A).
178 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396 & n.6 (1989); Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 1465
(noting "significantly redistributive issues" in corporate law, which affect the
relationship between shareholders and management).
179 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1173-74 (identifying reduced agency
costs as increasing value).
180 See Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 1396 n.6.
181 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at 1420 (arguing that corporate charters
and bylaws should reflect individual firm preferences).
182 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1167, 1172-74; Ribstein, supra note
87, at 390-91; Winter, supra note 30, at 259.
183 Macey & Miller, supra note 90, at 504-05 (noting that the Delaware Bar may
favor complex corporate law rules that will be unattractive to firms wishing to
avoid litigation costs).
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when compared to corporate law in other states such as Delaware. 181 Ohio
should reform its general corporation law starting from a neutral basis, such
as the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), 185 with
amendments made only to implement thoughtful policy in a straightforward
manner.
Ohio corporate law today reflects patchwork amendment to Ohio's
1955 general corporate law. The Ohio Constitution, adopted in 1851,
authorizes the Ohio General Assembly to enact a general corporation law,
rather than requiring special legislation to create business entities.186 In
1852, the Ohio General Assembly adopted a general corporation law, which
required corporations to be created for a statutorily enumerated purpose,
and provided different corporate laws depending on such purpose. !87 In
1927, Ohio adopted a new general corporation law, including a provision
authorizing corporations to be created for any purpose. 188 Ohio re-codified
all Ohio laws and adopted the present-day Ohio Revised Code in 1953.
Shortly thereafter, in 1955, Ohio adopted its present-day general
corporation law.18 9
Many changes have been made to Ohio corporate law since 1955,
including antitakeover legislation discussed infra, but some of the most
notable changes took place in 1986 amendments.' 90 As background, Ohio
adopted a constituency statute in 1985 that allowed Ohio directors to take
non-shareholder interests into account in pursuing the corporation's best
interests.' 9 ' Under director fiduciary responsibility laws prior to 1986
184 See Carney, supra note 35, at 736, 755 ("corporate law has a strong tendency
toward uniformity, but. . . all corporate laws are not identical"). Nonetheless,
Professor Carney's study showed that Ohio was one of only seven states that did
not adopt selected provisions of Model Business Corporation Act. Id. at 743-44
tbl.2.
185 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (2010).
186 OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
187 Act of May 1, 1852, vol. 50, § 73, 1852 Ohio Laws 272, 295; e.g., Act of May
3, 1878, § 9, 1878 Ohio Laws 128, 129 (authorizing wool growers associations to
organize as corporations).
188 General Corporation Act, No. 11, § 8623-3, 1927 Ohio Laws 9, 10. According
to Professor Ballantine, the 1927 Ohio General Corporation Act was among the
best in the country at the time and served as a model for the Uniform Business
Corporation Act. Henry Ballantine, Recent Legislation: Legislative Developments
in Corporation Law, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 422 (1927).
189 Act effective Aug. 1, 1955, No. 32, 1955 Ohio Laws 432 (revising and
renumbering the general corporation law).
190 Act effective Nov. 22, 1986, No. 278, 1986 Ohio Laws 6107 (amending parts of
the general corporation law).
191 Act effective Oct 10, 1984, No. 251, § 1701.59, 1984 Ohio Laws 2751, 2752;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (West Supp. 2012).
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reform, Ohio directors enjoyed significant protection from shareholder
litigation for breaching their fiduciary duties. 1
92
The 1981 battle for control over Marathon Oil Company, which
resulted in a merger with U.S. Steel Corporation, one of the largest mergers
in the United States at that time, provides context to explain director
fiduciary responsibility in Ohio prior to 1986. In Radol v. Thomas, the U.S.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Marathon board of
directors (i.e. the target board) breached their fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders in negotiating the merger. 93 U.S. Steel, acting as a white
knight, agreed to leave the existing Marathon board in place following the
merger, thereby providing a job-security benefit to target management that
did not accrue to target shareholders. 194 Despite directors' conflicting
loyalties because of their self-interest in staying on the board, the trial court
instructed the jury that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties
unless they "committed fraud, or intentionally acted contrary to the best
interest of the corporation and the shareholders."' 95 Moreover, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that "in the context of corporate control
transactions the burden of proof shifts to the directors to establish the
fairness to shareholders of any transaction that would have the effect of
retaining the directors' control."' 196 Ohio directors, therefore, enjoyed
considerable discretion in managing the corporations' affairs prior to 1986.
Despite Ohio directors' strong protection under contemporary Ohio
corporate law, Ohio adopted sweeping amendments in 1986 to depart from
comparative corporate law.' 97 These amendments relaxed director fiduciary
192 Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-58 (6th Cir. 1985).
'
93 Id. at 256.
194 Id.
195 Id. The court further explained the business judgment rule and fiduciary duties
in Ohio prior to 1986:
The Ohio formulation of these duties was codified in 1984 in
O.R.C. § 1701.59(B), and under the duty of loyalty, a "director
shall perform his duties as a director.., in good faith, in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation," while under the duty of care, a director must
perform his duties "with the care that an ordinary prudent person
in a like position would use under similar circumstances."
Moreover, in evaluating a director's compliance with the duty of
care, Ohio courts adhere to the "business judgment rule," and
will not inquire into the wisdom of actions taken by the directors
in the absence of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion.
Id.
196 Id. at 257.
197 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F) (West Supp. 2012); see also Deborah
Cahalane, Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of Director
Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 663, 663-64 (1987); Oesterle, supra note 19, at 910-
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duties to the point of non-existence, 98 provided excessive advancement and
indemnification for directors 99 and adopted a statute authorizing poison
pills.
200
The 1986 amendments were likely a response to contemporary events
rather than legislation grounded in thoughtful policy rationale. First, the
antitakeover legislation was a reaction to the threatened takeover of
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.20 1 Second, at least one contemporary case in
another jurisdiction held directors liable for breaching fiduciary duties
likely propelled the legislation. 2  Specifically, in the Delaware case Smith
13. Critics of the '86 amendments argue that the director protections were designed
to give directors nearly unlimited control over corporate governance. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.2. On the other hand, proponents point to a development
in comparative corporate law, namely Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985), that subjected directors to liability. Morgan Shipman, Regulating Corporate
Takeovers: The Case for Reasonable State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers:
Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 507, 519
(1988). Professor Shipman often addressed the Ohio General Assembly concerning
corporate law and takeover regulation, "representing the Corporate Law Committee
of the Ohio State Bar Association and in an individual capacity." Id. at 507. Afier
Van Gorkom, statutory director protection, so the argument goes, was necessary to
attract good directors and compete among states for corporate charters. See
§ 1701.59 cmt. (1986).
It is believed to be important for corporations to be able to obtain
and retain those persons who can best serve as directors. It is also
important that the directors of corporations feel free to use their
best judgment in making business decisions that are in the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders without undue
concern for personal liability. It is also believed that it is
important for corporations to be able to attract and retain
"outside" (non-management) directors who are in a position to
provide independent judgment. The amendments to Sec. 1701.59
are designed to help achieve these goals.
Id. In Ohio, a threatened takeover of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. was likely the
proximate cause of the '86 amendments. Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 373.
198 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
199 § 1701.13(E); Miller v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2928 (Ohio July 3,
2012) (upholding an Ohio director's advancement rights); see also Porter, supra
note 10, at 185 n.56; Edward Schrag, Robert Lautzenhiser & Shawn Flahive,
Director and Officer Liability and Indemnification: The Ohio Approach, 20 U.
TOL. L. REv. 1, 38-67 (1988) (extensively discussing indemnification and related
matters for Ohio directors).
200 § 1701.16(B); see discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
201 Carney, supra note 35, at 751 tbl 3; Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 373.
202 See Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive, supra note 199, at 11-16; see also
Shipman, supra note 197, at 519, 533 ("Section 1701.59(D) is a necessary
adjustment of state law in light of the harsh liability-generating principles of Smith
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v. Van Gorkom, the directors of Trans Union Corporation breached their
duties to shareholders by accepting a merger proposal despite obtaining
information from experts and holding a shareholder ratification vote to
approve the deal.
20 3
As a result of the 1986 amendments, shareholder wealth in Ohio has
measurably declined.20 4 Quite simply, historical circumstances that led to
patchwork Ohio corporate law removed from sound policy rationale does
not justify Ohio corporate law today. This section provides additional
historical context and discusses specific Ohio corporate law issues with the
following most important provisions to shareholder wealth and firm cost of
capital: (1) shareholder voting provisions; (2) director fiduciary
responsibility provisions; and (3) antitakeover regulation.
1. Shareholder Voting
Inconsistent shareholder voting rules under Ohio corporate law should
be revised to better align with other provisions. State corporate codes are
"enabling statutes" that set default rules to be altered by corporate charters
and bylaws ("regulations" in Ohio) if desired, of course within the bounds
of statutory authority. 20 5 However, shareholder voting in Ohio is
inconsistent insomuch as some voting provisions grant shareholders
considerable control whereas other provisions make it difficult for
shareholders to act. In instances where it is difficult to act, including
amending the corporate charter, shareholder voting rules add an additional
layer of management protection and decrease shareholder wealth, because
companies have little flexibility to opt out of default provisions that give
management considerable discretion. 0 6
As noted, the 1955 Ohio General Corporation Act persists today, as
amended with patchwork updates that have resulted in complex and
extreme statutes. Particularly important are arcane shareholder voting
v. Van Gorkom."). As of this writing, the Ohio Revised Code section Professor
Shipman cites is now codified at section 1701.59(E).
203 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Supreme
Court stated that the Trans Union directors' reliance on experts was not reasonable
under the circumstances and that shareholders were not sufficiently informed to
approve the deal. Id. at 877, 891-93. Casual board procedure, the failure to obtain
an appraisal study and the failure to vet the offer in the market may have led to the
court's finding in Van Gorkom. See, e.g., id at 877.
204 Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 374.
205 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at 1416-17.
206 See Gregg Jarrell & Annette Poulsen, Shark Repellents & Stock Prices, 19 J.
FIN. EcoN. 127, 131-32, 155 (1987) ("The non-fair-price amendments, which
include the two categories of supermajority, authorization-of-preferred-stock, and
classified-board amendments, show a negative and statistically significant average
abnormal return of 3.0%.").
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provisions that date back to 1927 and reflect policy implemented at a time
207
when corporations existed in a vastly different regulatory environment.
Each of the three shareholder voting provisions highlighted in this
section-amending the corporate charter, cumulative voting and the
quorum requirement-date back to the 1927 Ohio General Corporation Act,
but only the cumulative voting provision has been materially amended.20 8
First, Ohio corporate law provides default rules making it difficult to
amend the corporate charter and regulations, which makes it difficult for
shareholders to collectively act. 20 9 To amend the corporate charter, most
states require that directors propose charter amendments, which
shareholders must ratify, usually by a majority vote.210 Ohio, on the other
hand, does not require that the board propose charter amendments, but does
authorize shareholders to unilaterally amend the charter with a two-thirds
supermajority shareholder vote. 21  This unusual rule is both too broad (i.e.
shareholders may unilaterally amend) and too narrow (i.e. supermajority
approval) for shareholders to opt out of default charter provisions that
212provide tremendous management protection. Further, the supermajoritydefault rule for amending the corporate charter makes amendment more
207 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.4-.5 (West 2009); see also discussion infra Part
IV.A. 1. The 1927 Ohio Act predated the Great Depression, the Securities Act of
1933, the Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, among
other major regulatory legislation.
208 General Corporation Act, No. 11, §§ 8623-15, 8623-48, 8623-50, 1927 Ohio
Laws 9, 14-16, 30-31; § 1701.55 (cumulative voting); § 1701.62 (quorum
requirement for shareholder meeting to elect the board of directors); § 1701.71
(amending the charter). In addition, the provision that allows for shareholder action
without a meeting, but only with unanimous approval, dates to 1927 and is too
onerous to be practically useful. § 1701.11 (C); Davidoff, supra note 4 ("But this
written consent is required to be unanimous except for amending Abercrombie's
articles. This is impossible to obtain in a public corporation.").
209 Jeffrey Gordon, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1583 (1989).
210 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West 2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 10.03 (2010).
211 § 1701.71; Porter, supra note 23, at 661 n. 114. On a related note, a two-thirds
supermajority of shareholders is required to make other changes. E.g., § 1701.31
(reduction of state capital); § 1701.76 (asset sale); § 1701.78 (merger). The Ohio
provision requiring a two-thirds supermajority vote to approve an acquisition is
very unusual as most states, recognizing supermajority approval as too onerous,
require only majority shareholder approval. OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 33.2 12 E.g., § 1701.59(E) ("This division does not apply if, and only to the extent that,
at the time of a director's act or omission that is the subject of complaint, the
articles or the regulations of the corporation state by specific reference to this
division that the provisions of this division do not apply to the corporation.").
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costly and can provide minority shareholders with hold-up power that
enables them to extract side payments.1 3
In addition, Ohio has an unusual provision that does not permit
directors to unilaterally amend the regulations, except with regard to minor
provisions.21 4 Issues arise because it is difficult for the board of directors to
215be nimble and act in the corporation's best interests. A special
shareholder vote must be held to authorize director proposals to amend the
regulations. 1 6 In some situations, the board may have to wait several
months for an annual meeting to amend regulations when immediate action
is necessary.1 7 To provide for more nimble and efficient firms, Ohio should
adopt a rule allowing shareholders to authorize boards of directors to
unilaterally amend corporate regulations.2t 8
Second, Ohio's cumulative shareholder voting provision 21 9 may be
undesirable. Cumulative voting implements an election structure where
each share has as many votes as there are candidates for director, and the
213 Gordon, supra note 209, at 1583-84.
214 § 1701.11 (A)(1) (requiring shareholder approval in many situations to amend
corporate regulations); § 1701.10 (permitting the Board to adopt regulations within
ninety days of incorporation). Recent legislation has made it possible for the board
of directors to amend the regulations in some respects. § 1701.1 I(C); H.B. 301,
126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006). Nonetheless, shareholders may not
authorize the board to unilaterally amend the regulations in many material respects.
Porter supra note 10, at 189-90 (citing code sections which require shareholder
approval to amend the regulations). The board may amend the corporate charter in
limited situations. § 1701.70.
215 Porter, supra note 10, at 188.
216 § 1701.11(A); see also Porter, supra note 10, at 188 ("Ohio has long stood apart
from other states by requiring any changes to the regulations (called 'bylaws' in
Delaware and many other states) to be approved by shareholders.). But see section
1701.1 l(A)(1)(d), which provides for director amendment in the following
circumstance:
If and to the extent that the articles or regulations so provide or
permit and unless a provision of the Revised Code reserves such
authority to shareholders, by the directors, provided that no
provision or permission in the articles or regulations may divest
shareholders of the power, or limit the shareholders' power, to
adopt, amend, or repeal regulations.
§ 1701.11(A)(1)(d).
2 For companies with articles of incorporation that do not authorize electronic
proxies, as permitted in Ohio by 1999 legislation, the Board may have to wait until
an annual meeting to make necessary corporate changes. Porter, supra note 10, at
188-90.218E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (West 2010); REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 10.20(b) (2010).
219 § 1701.55.
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votes may be concentrated among particular directors.22' As such, a default
cumulative voting rule permits gamesmanship in electing corporate
directors. Again, companies may be inflexible because current Ohio law
requires a provision in a corporate charter or amendment by supermajority
shareholder vote to eliminate cumulative voting.22' Ohio's default rule
should be non-cumulative voting with an opt in election if the firm decides
222
to give minority shareholders a greater voice in electing directors.
Third, there is effectively no shareholder quorum requirement despite
the express codification of a "quorum requirement. 2 23 Defining a quorum
to be those present at a meeting is effectively no quorum at all. The absence
of a quorum requirement promotes gamesmanship in corporate governance
by permitting corporate action by only those shareholders present at a
meeting. To be sure, most voting matters have a quorum requirement that is
224
specially designated for that matter.  Nonetheless, a more appropriate rule
would require a majority of the shares entitled to vote to be present for a
shareholder vote.225 For these reasons, voting provisions under Ohio
corporate law should be revised accordingly.
2. Director Fiduciary Responsibility
Ohio directors have little fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and
other stakeholders due to extreme and complex law. To be sure, Ohio
directors should have considerable discretion to make business decisions
and conduct corporate affairs under the business judgment rule, but they
should not have nearly unlimited discretion that removes meaningful
accountability to shareholders. Without meaningful director accountability
to any stakeholders, a state's corporate law is antithetical to the notion that
fiduciary duties allow shareholders, or even other stakeholders, to monitor
corporate affairs.226 Concerns about accountability are particularly acute in
situations where management has personal interests that do not align with
220 E.g. id § 1701.55(D).
221 Id. § 1701.55(C). Shareholders' right to cumulative voting is subject to notice
requirements. Id.
222 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212, 214 (West 2010); REV. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 7.28(b) (2010).2 23 See § 1701.51(A).
224 § 7.25 cmt. n.2 ("Implicit in section 7.25 is the concept that the determination of
the voting groups entitled to vote, and the quorum and voting requirements
applicable thereto, must be determined separately for each 'matter' coming before a
meeting. As a result, different quorum and voting requirements may be applicable
to different portions of a meeting, depending on the matter being considered.").
22' E.g., § 7.25 (defining a quorum as a majority of shares entitled to vote on the
matter). But see tit. 8, § 216 (defining a quorum as the shares present for most
matters other than electing directors).
226 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1191.
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firm interests, for example, when making executive compensation decisions
or during corporate control change situations.
i. Director Duties of Care and Loyalty Under Current Ohio
Law
Ohio corporate law excessively curtails both the fiduciary duty of care
and duty of loyalty.227 First, the fiduciary duty of care is codified in Ohio,228
but other provisions effectively eliminate its substance in a complex
manner. 229 Section 1701.59(B) adopts an "ordinarily prudent person"
standard to determine whether a director's business decisions are protected
under the business judgment rule. In most other states, the business
judgment rule affords directors more protection under a gross negligence
standard.23° Moreover, Ohio's objective prudent person standard lacks
clarity because it is often unclear how a prudent person, or prudent
corporate director, would behave in fact-specific situations.231 Further,
courts reviewing business decisions for prudence after the fact may take
hindsight into account (i.e. second-guess business decisions). By contrast, a
227 § 1701.59; see Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1827 (stating that some states have
adopted defacto constituency statutes indirectly through fiduciary duty provisions);
Porter, supra note 23, at 635-36 (noting that the Ohio business judgment rule has
been "codified and strengthened").
221 § 1701.59(B). Under Ohio law, the fiduciary duty of care is defined, in pertinent
part, as follows:
A director shall perform the director's duties as a director,
including the duties as a member of any committee of the
directors upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
229 Porter, supra note 23, at 635-36.
230 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750-51 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(stating that the duty of care holds corporate fiduciaries to a gross negligence
standard); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound. The Twentieth Century Evolution of
Directors'Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 63, 123 (2009) ("By the mid 1980s, the
Delaware courts collapsed the duty of care into the business judgment rule; they
declared that the business judgment rule altered the standard of care from
negligence to gross negligence and made gross negligence a prerequisite for
rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule. Within a few years, these
ideas were strongly cemented into U.S. corporate law.").
231 The term "objective" is used here to describe a behavioral standard based upon a
third person (i.e. a prudent person). However, the "prudent person" standard is still
subjective insomuch as a judge's subjective view affects the standard when
multiple judges are unable to reach consensus as to what constitutes a prudent
person's behavior in a particular situation.
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subjective business judgment rule requiring a director to "act in accordance
with his/her good faith business judgment of what is in the best interests of
the corporation" maintains deference to directors and provides more clarity
than the prudent person standard.232 Ohio's business judgment rule provides
additional management protection in damages actions, where Ohio law
requires intentional or reckless disregard of the best interests of the
corporation to hold directors liable.233
Despite the unusually low negligence (i.e. ordinarily prudent person)
standard for the Ohio business judgment rule, other provisions buttress
Ohio's business judgment rule to grant directors considerable discretion.
The burden of proof for a breach of fiduciary duty is the clear and
convincing standard, which is higher than the typical preponderance of the
evidence standard.234 More importantly, Ohio's constituency provision, one
of the broadest in the nation, effectively nullifies the fiduciary duty of
care. 23 Under Ohio's constituency provision, which rejects shareholder
primacy principles and the Delaware Revlon doctrine,236 directors may
consider such broad interests in determining the best interests of the
corporation that they effectively must consider no interests-including
shareholder interests.237 In sum, the duty of care combined with Ohio's
constituency provision provides excessive discretion to Ohio directors
conducting corporate affairs, and does so in an odd manner.
232 E.g., Willard ex rel Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) ("The contrast between the provisions of Code
§ 13.1-690 and those contained in § 8.30 of the RMBCA convinces us that, in
Virginia, a director's discharge of duties is not measured by what a reasonable
person would do in similar circumstances or by the rationality of the ultimate
decision. Instead, a director must act in accordance with his/her good faith business
judgment of what is in the best interests of the corporation. Thus, the Revlon test is
not applicable in Virginia.").
233 § 1701.59(E).
234 Id. § 1701.59(D)-(E); see also Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive, supra note 199,
at 22 (explaining the clear and convincing standard for proving Ohio fiduciary
duties).2351Id. § 1701.59(F).
236 In Delaware, directors are required to act in the best interests of shareholders
rather than a multitude of constituency interests. Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
237 § 1701.59(F) ("[A] director, in determining what the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of
the corporation's shareholders and, in the director's discretion, may consider any of
the following: (1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers; (2) The economy of the state and nation; (3) Community and
societal considerations; (4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may
be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.").
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Second, the duty of loyalty is excessively curtailed under Ohio law.238
Ohio's duty of loyalty is codified as a safe harbor to uphold actions
authorized by conflicted directors if conflicts are disclosed, informed
shareholders approve a transaction or a transaction is fair.239 To bring a duty
of loyalty claim in these situations, however, plaintiffs bear some nontrivial
burden to show that directors are "interested" or engaged in self-dealing.240
Then, the burden shifts to directors to vindicate their behavior with one of
the affirmative defenses in section 1701.60.241
Under this framework for the Ohio duty of loyalty, directors maintain
business judgment rule protection, even when making decisions that may
242
result in a change of control or a termination of the director's service.
Further, directors may be outside the scope of the duty of loyalty even if
making self-interested decisions affecting their own compensation.243 In
Delaware, by contrast, directors are treated as inherently conflicted and
238Id. § 1701.60. Under Ohio law, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is designed to
prevent directors from yielding to the pressure of conflicts of interests in
performing their duties. See id § 1701.60(A).239 Id. § 1701.60(A).
240 Id. §§ 1701.59(D)(1), 1701.60(C); see also Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive,
supra note 199, at 24 ("The only exception to this one-way application of the
burden of proof may occur when the director's conduct involves self-dealing. In the
case of a transaction in which the plaintiff has shown that a director has a personal
interest, the burden of proof may shift to the director to establish one of the
'defenses' set forth in section 1701.60 (e.g., that the transaction was 'fair' to the
corporation); Shipman, supra note 197, at 534-35. At least one court has had
difficulty explaining the burden of proof under Ohio's duty of loyalty. See United
States v. Skeddle, 940 F. Supp. 1146, 1150-53 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (discussing the
burden of proof under section 1701.60 with an analogy to Delaware law). One
interpretation is that section 1701.60 requires a plaintiff to show a duty of care
violation in order to shift the burden of proof to directors, who then bear the burden
of showing they met one of the safe harbor provisions under section 1701.60(A).
But see § 1701.59(D)(3) ("Nothing contained in this division limits relief available
under section 1701.60 of the Revised Code.").
241 Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive, supra note 199, at 24; Shipman, supra note
197, at 534-35.
142 § 1701.60(C) ("For purposes of division (A) of this section, a director is not an
interested director solely because the subject of the contract, action, or transaction
may involve or affect a change in control of the corporation or his continuation in
office as a director of that corporation."). Further, section 1701.59(D), as amended,
states that clear and convincing evidence of director actions not in the best interests
of the corporation is required, even in the case of actions that may result in change
of control or director termination. Id. § 1701.59(D); see also Schrag, Lautzenhiser
& Flahive, supra note 199, at 25-27 (noting that Ohio rejected Delaware's Unocal
doctrine, in which interested directors are closely scrutinized for fiduciary
responsibility).
243 § 1701.60(A)(3).
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closely scrutinized in these situations.244 As a result, Ohio directors may
escape accountability for decisions relating to interested transactions that
may be better monitored with a stronger duty of loyalty. But it is far from
clear that a self-interested manager (e.g., one resisting a tender offer) should
245be accorded the same deference as a manager in good standing.
The main context in which Ohio directors will be shielded from
litigation, but would not be in Delaware, is in certain situations where there
is an imminent change in corporate control and competing bidders for the
firm-the so-called Revlon Zone. In Delaware, when there is an imminent
change in corporate control and competing bidders, the firm is deemed to
be "in play" and directors have Revlon duties.246 In short, Revlon duties
244 Sections 1701.59(D) and 1701.60(C) essentially reject Unocal and its progeny
under Delaware law, which set a threshold test to reach the protection of the
business judgment rule in change of control situations. Id. §§ 1701.59(D); see
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) ("This Court has
recognized that directors are often confronted with an 'inherent conflict of interest'
during contests for corporate control 'because of the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.' Consequently, in such situations, before the
board is accorded the protection of the business judgment rule, and that rule's
concomitant placement of the burden to rebut its presumption on the plaintiff, the
board must carry its own initial two-part burden ..... (citations omitted)); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Chesapeake Corp. v.
Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328-29 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("As Unocal recognized, the
possibility that management might be displaced if a premium-producing tender
offer is successful creates an inherent conflict between the interests of stockholders
and management.").
245 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1197-98 (distinguishing the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty); see, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 63, at 154-55 (arguing
that the Delaware Supreme Court should have decided Revlon solely on duty of
loyalty grounds).
246 Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
("Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be
justifiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when
bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes
inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing
favorites with the contending factions. Market forces must be allowed to operate
freely to bring the target's shareholders the best price available for their
equity. Thus, as the trial court ruled, the shareholders' interests necessitated that the
board remain free to negotiate in the fulfillment of that duty." (footnote omitted));
see also Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)
("Because of the intended sale of control, the Paramount-Viacom transaction has
economic consequences of considerable significance to the Paramount
stockholders. Once control has shifted, the current Paramount stockholders will
have no leverage in the future to demand another control premium. As a result, the
Paramount stockholders are entitled to receive, and should receive, a control
premium and/or protective devices of significant value. There being no such
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require directors to seek the transaction offering the best current value to
247 24Oh
shareholders. By contrast, Ohio's constituency statute248 and other laws
protective provisions in the Viacom-Paramount transaction, the Paramount
directors had an obligation to take the maximum advantage of the current
opportunity to realize for the stockholders the best value reasonably available ....
The consequences of a sale of control impose special obligations on the directors of
a corporation. In particular, they have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek
the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.").
247 Revlon duties require that directors make informed decisions to maximize
shareholder value, but Revlon duties do not provide a "blueprint" that directors
must follow. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 44 ("In determining which alternative
provides the best value for the stockholders, a board of directors is not limited to
considering only the amount of cash involved, and is not required to ignore totally
its view of the future value of a strategic alliance."); see, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at
184 ("While Forstmann's $57.25 offer was objectively higher than Pantry Pride's
$56.25 bid, the margin of superiority is less when the Forstmann price is adjusted
for the time value of money. In reality, the Revlon board ended the auction in
return for very little actual improvement in the final bid. The principal benefit went
to the directors, who avoided personal liability to a class of creditors to whom the
board owed no further duty under the circumstances."). In stock or other non-cash
consideration deals, for example, the target board should make informed efforts to
quantify the value of competing offers. QVCNetwork, 637 A.2d at 44. In addition,
target board behavior favoring one bidder over another, such as adopting
unreasonable takeover defenses enabling such favoritism, may run afoul of Revlon
duties:
When the Paramount directors met on November 15 to consider
QVC's increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of their
own misconceptions and missed opportunities to eliminate the
restrictions they had imposed on themselves. Yet, it was not "too
late" to reconsider negotiating with QVC. The circumstances
existing on November 15 made it clear that the defensive
measures, taken as a whole, were problematic ....
Id. at 50. For additional discussion of Revlon duties from Delaware courts, see
Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, No. 14696, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3,
at *13 n.3, (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996), stating:
What I take to be distinctive about this state of affairs [when
"Revlon" duties apply] is three things principally. First, in this
situation the board must seek to achieve greatest available current
value; it may not, in effect, trade achievable current value for a
prospect of greater future value, as it may normally do in the
exercise of its good faith business judgment. Historically, one
would say that courts would be slow to impose this limitation
except in limited circumstances. And indeed despite the fact that
commentators tended to treat the Revlon case as revolutionary,
recent cases have made clear that it did not deviate from this
tradition very greatly. Second, when in this situation, a board's
duty to be informed will require it to fully consider alternative
transactions offered by any responsible buyer. Third, in part
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provide Ohio directors with more discretion in this context to sell the firm
to bidders in transactions that do not maximize current shareholder value.
More specifically, fiduciary duty lawsuits in Delaware are more likely
to result in injunctive relief that can delay or even enjoin deals. In recent
years, some Delaware cases have granted plaintiffs preliminary injunctions
that delay friendly transactions in the Revlon context.2 49 This distinction
between Ohio and Delaware law is less potent in suits for damages because
Delaware law allows firms to opt in to a heightened duty of care,250 and in
fact most Delaware firms have elected to do so. Far from suggesting that
Ohio should not reform its corporate law, however, this distinction between
Ohio and Delaware law provides guidance for affirmatively reforming Ohio
corporate law.
ii. Recommendations for Reforming Ohio Director Fiduciary
Duties
In reforming director fiduciary responsibility, Ohio should promote
deference to business decisions under the business judgment rule while
effectively reinstating director duties of care and loyalty to shareholders.
Notwithstanding shareholder primacy, management should have great
discretion to conduct corporate affairs in most situations .2 l In the change of
"Revlon duties" are not distinctive board duties at all, but a
changed standard of judicial review. That is when "Revlon
duties" are triggered a burden will shift to the directors and the
court will undertake more active review of the traditional
directorial duties of care and loyalty under a reasonableness
standard.
Id. (citations omitted). Delaware Courts have also adopted analytical steps to
explain the Revlon doctrine. See generally QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 45 ("The key
features of an enhanced scrutiny test are: (a) a judicial determination regarding the
adequacy of the decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a judicial
examination of the reasonableness of the directors' action in light of the
circumstances then existing. The directors have the burden of proving that they
were adequately informed and acted reasonably.").
248 § 1701.59(F).
249 E.g., In re Del Monte Foods Corp., 25 A.3d 813, 844 (Del. Ch. 2011) (granting
preliminary injunction for twenty days); In re Netsmart Tech. Inc., 924 A.2d 171,
197, 209 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that there is a duty to auction and eventually
granting a preliminary injunction pending adequate disclosure to shareholders); In
re Toys "R" Us, 877 A.2d 975, 999, 1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding that the Revlon
duties did not create a preliminary injunction because the Board followed
procedures).
250 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
251 Although most management decisions are protected under the business
judgment rule, and the idea that benefitting non-shareholder stakeholders benefits
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control context with multiple bidders-the Revlon Zone-where, as noted,
there is a real-world distinction between Ohio and Delaware law, Ohio
should provide fiduciary duties distinct from Delaware's Revlon duties.
252
Revlon duties can be perceived to limit the target board's role when there is
an imminent change of control and multiple bidders, in which case director
conduct may lead to litigation that holds-up or even enjoins deals
altogether. Further, Revlon duties put directors in a more passive role that
253
may deter them from actively negotiating in shareholders' best interests.
But target directors may play an active role in negotiating deals without
abdicating their duty to shareholders. In other words, Ohio law can strike a
middle ground between complete director passivity and the existing Ohio
law, which is extremely deferential to directors. To do so, corporate law
should delegate negotiation responsibility to directors under a framework
that provides a balance between director discretion and shareholder
accountability.
254
A subjective business judgment rule requiring directors to make good
faith business judgments in the best interests of the corporation may
achieve these policy objectives.255  Ohio should also eliminate its
constituency statute and provide a more general statute delegating authority
to directors to act as duly elected representatives of shareholders. 6 In
addition, Ohio should lower the standard of proof from clear and
convincing to the more typical preponderance of the evidence standard.
Under this approach, directors maintain considerable discretion to
conduct corporate affairs. In the tender offer context, for example, directors
may consider confidential non-public information about the firm to defeat
shareholders as well as residual claimants, management must still be able to make a
good faith assertion that management decisions are designed to benefit
shareholders in some way. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("A board may have regard for
various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.").
252 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 150-54 (distinguishing a negotiations model from
Delaware law and Revlon duties).
253 But see Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 n. 16 ("By this we do not embrace the
'passivity' thesis rejected in Unocal. The directors' role remains an active one,
changed only in the respect that they are charged with the duty of selling the
company at the highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit." (citations
omitted)).
254 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 121-22 (citing Leo Herzel, John R. Schmidt & Scott
J. Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP.
L. REv. 107 (1980)). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1174-75.
255 E.g., Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
515 S.E.2d 277, 284-85 (Va. 1999).
256 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); Paramount Commc'ns v. QVC
Network, 637 A.2d 34, 41-42 (Del. 1994).
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the offer altogether, rather than strictly adhering to potentially superficial
criteria.257 Ohio directors may then make the best decision for the firm, but
are not so free from shareholder accountability as to act in their self-interest
to the detriment of the firm.
To be sure, under this model, courts are charged with evaluating
whether directors have acted as "faithful negotiating agents" for
shareholders in the takeover context.25 8 But these fiduciary duties are still
very deferential, and simple criteria can be adopted to restrict potential
fiduciary breaches. 259 In situations where directors defeat a tender offer
altogether, usually by adopting takeover defenses, 260 directors may do so
only if there is confidential information or a failed negotiation attempt to
secure a higher price. 26 In the auction context, only an effort to induce a
higher bid or differences between partial and any-and-all tender offers
justify favoring one bidder over another.262 A duty of care styled in this
manner would strike an appropriate balance to grant discretion to directors
making business decisions while still providing shareholders with a limited
monitoring device.
While Ohio should adopt provisions to heighten the standard of care,
flexible provisions should also be available to allow firms to elect to
increase director discretion. One such provision would allow corporations
to opt in to the heightened business judgment rule with a waiver of the duty
of care for damages suits, similar to Delaware General Corporation Law
section 102(b)(7). Currently, Ohio law has an opt out provision for the
business judgment rule when damages are sought.263 Shareholder choice
257 Nonetheless, exceptions based upon confidential information should be limited.
Oesterle, supra note 63, at 125-26 ("Even in a weak form, however, this argument
provides only limited justification for target management responses, and may too
easily conceal target manager selfishness. Arguments based on confidential
information are always easy to make, and, unless investigated on a case-by-case
basis, serve only to insulate target managers from accountability. Such a case-by-
case evaluation would be costly and a broader rule disfavoring the arguments based
on confidential information may prove the more prudent choice.").
25 Id. at 131.259 Id. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1196 (questioning whether
courts can feasibly follow criteria to enforce fiduciary duties).
260 Oesterle, supra note 55, at 64-70 (providing an overview of takeover defenses).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 94-95. Confidential information does not provide a basis for favoring one
bidder over another in an auction. Id. at 93. "An any-and-all offer states that the
bidder will buy any-or-all tendered shares of the target firm, as long as enough
shares are tendered to insure control." Oesterle, supra note 19, at 903 n.96.
263 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (West Supp. 2012) ("This division does
not apply if, and only to the extent that, at the time of a director's act or omission
that is the subject of complaint, the articles or the regulations of the corporation
496 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
regarding the business judgment rule reduces agency costs with flexibility
for shareholders to decide whether fiduciary duties, automatic blocking
mechanisms and/or shareholder voting are the best director-monitoring
device.264
Regarding the duty of loyalty, Ohio should consider a rule that finds
directors inherently conflicted when plaintiffs bring an action for injunctive
relief to stop director-negotiated transactions and in other self-dealing
265
situations. In situations where agency costs are high due to potential self-
dealing, interested managers should be forced to justify their decision or
removed from the decision-making process.266 Contrary to Ohio Revised
Code section 1701.60(C), this rule would place the burden on directors to
show that they met a section 1701.60(A) provision: that the deal was fair,267
approved by disinterested directors or ratified by informed shareholders.268
These procedures do not place an unreasonable burden on directors in these
situations and further promote the firm's best interests. Against this
background, Ohio corporate law should be amended to effectively reinstate
Ohio directors' duties of care and loyalty.
3. Antitakeover Statutes
Ohio antitakeover legislation is poorly drafted and implements extreme
policy such that it harms the business climate it is designed to help. Ohio's
six antitakeover statutes are considered extreme because they do not serve a
coherent purpose; only Pennsylvania and Massachusetts rival Ohio in this
state by specific reference to this division that the provisions of this division do not
agply to the corporation.").
Winter, supra note 30, at 259; see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 18, at
1174; Ribstein, supra note 87, at 390-91.
265 Oesterle, supra note 55, at 86-87 (noting that directors should be considered
inherently self-interested when instituting defenses against hostile tender offers). In
hostile tender offer situations, directors carry the burden to justify their conduct, for
example with a shareholder ratification vote. Id. Upon meeting this burden,
plaintiffs carry a high burden to show director misconduct. Id266 id.
267 Id. at 87 ("The standard of fairness in tender offers, however, would take its
conceptual cues solely from the reasonableness of the target managers' acts in light
of their role as a negotiating agent for the shareholders.").
268 See, e.g., Unitrin Inc., v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) ("If
the Court of Chancery concludes that individually and collectively the poison pill
and the Repurchase Program were proportionate to the threat the Board believed
American General posed, the Unitrin Board's adoption of the Repurchase Program
and the poison pill is entitled to review under the traditional business judgment
rule. The burden will then shift 'back to the plaintiffs who have the ultimate burden
of persuasion [in a preliminary injunction proceeding] to show a breach of the
director's fiduciary duties.' (quoting Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)).
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regard. 69 Ohio's antitakeover statutes discourage incorporation in Ohio
because they decrease shareholder wealth, raise the cost of capital to Ohio
companies and serve as a market signal of poor organizational
performance.27 0 There are negative effects on shareholder wealth because
statutory protection from the market for corporate control perpetuates
agency costs, thereby decreasing the takeover premium inherent in stock
price.271 And reincorporation in a jurisdiction with extreme takeover
protection is an indicator of poor or inefficient management because the
market may suspect that reincorporation is designed to protect management
from deals that would replace management with more efficient
leadership.272 In practice, the proxy advisory firm ISS advised Abercrombie
shareholders not to reincorporate in Ohio because it would shield
management from competitive pressure to perform.273 This subsection will
introduce Ohio takeover legislation in its historical context, discuss policy
issues with the statutes and make recommendations for reforming Ohio
antitakeover legislation.
i. Objectives for State Antitakeover Regulation
In addition to attracting charters and talented management in the race
274debate, state takeover legislation may be designed to discourage
unwanted bidders from coercing shareholders into business combinations,
but should not discourage friendly deals in which bidders negotiate deals
269 Several statutes constitute Ohio's legislative efforts to deter bidders for
corporate control. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.16(B) (West 2009) (authorizing
firms to adopt poison pills); § 1701.59(F) (West Supp. 2012) (constituency statute);
§ 1701.831 (control share acquisition act); § 1704.01-.07 (business combinations);
§ 1707.041 (control bid); § 1707.043 (disgorgement); see Subramanian, supra note
1, at 1873 (noting that Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Ohio have extreme
antitakeover statutes).
270 Romano, supra note 37, at 856 n.46; Ryngaert & Netter, supra note 19, at 373.
271 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1164 ("The value of any stock can be
understood as the sum of two components: the price that will prevail in the market
if there is no successful offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will be none)
and the price that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likelihood
that some offer will succeed)."); see also OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 531-32
("Higher takeover prices and the increased possibility of failure increase the
potential cost of any potential takeover, discourage first bidders at the margin, and
thereby deny some target-firm shareholders a significant potential increase in the
value of their shares by discouraging bidders from putting their firms in play.").
272 See discussion supra Part II.B; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44
(1982) ("The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent
management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced." (citations
omitted)).
273 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., supra note 14, at 4-5.
274 See discussion supra Part II.A.
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275
with target management. Antitakeover statute proponents argue that
collective action problems lead to shareholder coercion absent protection
from unwanted bidders.276 A hostile takeover generally consists of the
following two steps: first, a tender offer to obtain a toehold or majority
control interest in the target firm; second, a proxy contest to obtain enough
seats on the board of directors to effect a back-end merger. 77 In these
situations, it is argued, shareholders may be coerced into tendering their
shares to the unwanted bidder because if they do not tender immediately,
they will be squeezed-out later at a lower price. Exacerbating the
shareholder collective action problem, bidders, who are often management,
have an informational advantage over shareholders when short-lived tender
offers are made on a first-come, first-served basis.27 8
Different antitakeover statutes address these shareholder coercion
issues in different ways: for instance, some statutes are designed to give
target shareholders the opportunity to gather information, collectively
organize and weigh the desirability of the tender offer.279 Another example
are business combination statutes that require board approval to effect a
business combination, in effect driving bidders to negotiate with
shareholders through one voice (the target board).28 0
Regarding shareholder coercion, antitakeover statutes should be
considered in the context of firm-specific takeover defenses, including
shark repellants, 28 1 poison pills, lock-ups and repurchase agreements.
282
275 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 124-30 (discussing shareholder coercion problems in
tender offers); see, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 19, at 902, 906-08.
276 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 127-29; Oesterle, supra note 19, at 900-08.
277 Oesterle, supra note 19, at 894. Tender offers may be a two-tiered tender offer
or an any-and-all tender offer. In the back-end merger, the remaining shareholders
stock will be exchanged for other securities, such as preferred stock or debt. Id.; see
also Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995) (stating that
"commentators have characterized a return to proxy contests as 'the only
alternative to hostile takeovers to gain control against the will of the incumbent
directors"' (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for
Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALF. L. REV. 1071, 1134
(1990))).
278 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 161; see, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 55, at 60-61
(providing hypothetical examples).
2 79 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 168; e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.831,
1707.043 (West 2009).
200esterle, supra note 19, at 895 ("The drafters of the Delaware statute, by
effecting a statutory prohibition on back-end mergers and all their economic
equivalents, hoped to stop most bootstrap acquisitions that do not have the blessing
of existing management.").
281 Shark repellant takeover defenses are charter provisions that require a specific
shareholder vote. OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 512-13. Such provisions include
staggered and classified boards of directors, written consent procedures for
2012 Reforming Ohio Corporate Law and Securities 499
Regulation to Facilitate Investment in Ohio
When firm-specific takeover defenses and strategies are combined with
state antitakeover statutes, it can be very difficult for unwanted bidders to
283gain control of a corporation and complete a business combination.
Antitakeover statutes that ward-off unwanted bidders, instead driving
bidders to negotiate with the target board, should be designed to address
shareholder coercion that exploits collective action problems. 284 Because
alternatives to antitakeover legislation are available in the form of managers
as negotiating agents and firm-specific takeover defenses, antitakeover
statutes should be discretionary provisions that avoid the high costs of
285
mandatory provisions. In sum, antitakeover legislation should be
designed to put shareholders on equal footing with bidders.
286
The goals of eliminating shareholder collective action problems and
management's informational advantage are indeed noble at first blush, but
these issues have been subject to considerable debate. There is conflicting
evidence as to whether shareholders are actually coerced to tender their
share to unwanted bidders. Presumably, two-tiered tender offers are more
likely to result in shareholder coercion because those tender offers are more
likely to be heavily front-end loaded than any-and-all tender offers. 287 But
an SEC study has found fewer shareholders tender for potentially coercive
two-tier tender offers than any-and-all tender offers.288
Moreover, incidental consequences of antitakeover legislation can have
a detrimental impact on wealth-generating transactions. Paramount in this
respect is that neutralizing management's informational advantage
increases the cost of tender offers and reduces the number of bids, as
supported by empirical evidence. 28 9 As a result of fewer tender offers,
shareholder voting without a meeting, and limiting the creation of new seats on the
board of directors. Id.
282 Oesterle, supra note 19, at 884-85.283 Id.; Oesterle, supra note 55, at 64-65.
284 See Oesterle, supra note 19, at 900-02.
285 See Oesterle, supra note 63, at 126-30 (discussing shareholder coercion
problems in tender offers); see, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 19, at 902, 906-08. But
see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1194-203 (explaining the passivity
thesis).
286 See Oesterle, supra note 19, at 900-02.
287 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 130.
288 Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers:
The Imprisonment of the Free-riding Shareholder, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 304
(1987) ("The average premium for the 144 any-or-all offers, at 56.6% above the
pre-offer market price, does not differ significantly from the average yield on the
39 two-tier offers of 55.9% .... "); see also Oesterle, supra note 19, at 902.
289 Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 373 (1980) (stating that
the number of tender offers made decreased and the cost of tender offers increased
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managers may become entrenched because low stock price-indicating
managerial inefficiency-may not attract a takeover bid as it otherwise
might.290 Regarding fairness, management's informational advantage is
equitable to shareholders because empirical evidence shows that target
shareholders consistently capture more of the value created by transactions
than do bidders.291 In fact, disclosure during a transaction is inequitable
among bidders because second bidders may free ride on the first bidder's
disclosures to obtain a bidding advantage.292
But even if there is shareholder coercion and bidders' informational
advantage could be neutralized, state antitakeover statutes should not be
designed to discourage friendly and hostile business combinations alike-in
effect discouraging all deals. Instead, antitakeover statutes should be
designed to enable the target board to act as negotiating agents for
293
shareholders to limit shareholder coercion with a collective voice.
Friendly deals in which the target board acts as a negotiating agent on
behalf of shareholders should be encouraged to increase shareholder
wealth.294 Target boards provide needed flexibility to respond to tender
offers and do so in a timely manner.295 By contrast, automatic blocking
mechanisms may not provide the needed flexibility that negotiating agents
provide.296 Critics of the active manager, who embrace the "passivity
thesis," charge that agency problems between management and
shareholders limit board capacity to act as agents for shareholders.297 In any
following passage of the Williams Act). Furthermore, the number of tender offers
did not return to pre-Act levels for eleven years. OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 169.
290 See discussion supra Part II.B.
291 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 25-26; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at
1187.
292 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 168; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at
1178; Subramanian, supra note 52, at 700-04 (discussing the "Revlon Problem" in
the context of market efficiency).
293 See, e.g., Oesterle supra note 19, at 900-02, 906-08.
294 See generally Oesterle, supra note 55, at 64-73 (discussing boards of directors
as agents negotiating on behalf of shareholders). But see generally Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 18, at 1174-82.
295 See Oesterle, supra note 55, at 63. Fiduciary duty laws can provide for the
proper target director role in negotiating transactions. Id. at 72-73.
296 See id. at 67.
297 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN L. REv. 1, 1 (1982-83) ("In most cases resistance reflects either
mismanagement (to the extent it pointlessly denies shareholders the opportunity to
obtain a premium) or manager's self-protection (to the extent its point is to
preserve managers' jobs or 'sell' their acquiescence in exchange for bonuses or
promises of future employment)."). Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that
auctioning the company will increase the price for corporate control, reducing the
number of takeovers, and in turn reduce the market for corporate control as a check
on inefficient management. Id. at 2. But see Oesterle, supra note 55, at 56, 73-81.
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event, these passivity thesis scholars also embrace friendly deals . 98 In other
words, there does not appear to be a sound intellectual basis for
discouraging all business combinations as Ohio does under its antitakeover
legislation.299
Despite Ohio antitakeover proponents' arguments discouraging friendly
deals, 300 laws that restrict all deals are too confining. 30 1 This section will
advocate Ohio antitakeover legislation that encourages bidders to negotiate
with the target board to address shareholder coercion issues. In addition,
antitakeover legislation should be clearly drafted, discretionary rather than
mandatory (i.e. firms may opt out or opt in), and consistent with related
statutes. Antitakeover legislation designed with these policy objectives
attracts corporate charters and attracts talented management in the race
debate, while also remedying any shareholder coercion issues.
302
ii. Ohio Antitakeover Legislation: Its Historical Context
Ohio commenced corporate takeover regulation in 1969 with a first
generation antitakeover statute-the Ohio Takeover Act, which is now
298 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1174 ("The argument presented above
establishes that takeovers are beneficial to both shareholders and society.").
299 Even one shareholder primacy critic agrees that Ohio corporate law is extreme.
Fisch, supra note 50, at 657.
300 See Shipman, supra note 197, at 527 (advocating antitakeover legislation aimed
at friendly deals). But see Morgan Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 757
(1970). Further, a practitioner argues:
The real impact of the law, in my opinion, will be felt not so
much in its application as in its hovering omnipresence. I suspect,
so far as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are concerned, the
corporate takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the
past. Acquisitions will hereafter be negotiated. If management is
unresponsive to the desire of shareholders it will be removed by
proxy contest carried on in the open rather than by the secretly
organized surprise attack which has, up to now, characterized the
takeover bid.
Arthur I. Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIO ST. B. Ass'N REP. 65, 73 (Jan.
19, 1970). Based upon this quotation, Mr. Vorys advocated antitakeover legislation
aimed only at non-friendly deals.
301 E.g., Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-39 (1966)
(discussing law on contracts between an officer and his corporation as of 1880).
302 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1861 (noting that extreme antitakeover legislation
discouraging all deals may decrease shareholder wealth and does not attract
corporate charters better than non-extreme antitakeover legislation); e.g., Oesterle,
supra note 19, at 900-08 (noting that the Delaware business combination statute is
purportedly designed to address shareholder coercion problems).
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known as the Control Bid Statute. 303 The prior year, in 1968, Congress
enacted the Williams Act to regulate corporate takeovers at the federal
level.304 The federal Williams Act requires that corporate bidders give
target shareholders twenty days to respond to tender offers,30 5 provides for
all shareholders to receive the same price for their shares,0 6 prohibits the
bidder from making open-market purchases during the tender offer307 and
provides for shareholder withdrawal rights.30 8 Expanding upon the Williams
Act, the Ohio Takeover Act, as originally written, required bidders to
disclose certain information, provided authority for the Ohio Division of
Securities to suspend deals and provided a rarely-used hearing process to
resolve non-compliance with the Takeover Act.30 9
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE Corp., struck down
an Illinois law modeled upon the Ohio Takeover Act as unconstitutional.10
The Illinois Act at issue in MITE Corp. was struck down under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine for discriminating against interstate commerce
due to its broad applicability to firms that were not incorporated in
Illinois.31 The Court also considered whether the Williams Act preempted
the Illinois Act, but only three Justices joined in faulting the Act on
preemption grounds.3t 2 Preemption issues arose due to the indefinite delay
that might exceed the twenty-day waiting period prescribed under the
Williams Act and the Illinois Secretary of State's discretion under the Act
303 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (West 2009); Ohio Takeover Act, No. 90,
1969 Ohio Laws 352 (revising section 1707.041 of the Ohio Revised Code);
Shipman, supra note 300, at 723.
304 The Williams Act added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Senator Harrison Williams, the namesake and sponsor of
the Williams Act, went to federal prison on bribery charges. OESTERLE, supra note
22, at 534.
305 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-I (2011). For a more thorough explanation of the Williams
Act's provisions, see OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 161-63.
306 The all-holders rule prohibits bidders from discriminating against shareholders
holding shares of the type sought. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1). The best price rule
requires bidders to extend price increases during the tender offer to all
shareholders. Id. § 240.14d- 10(a)(2).3071 d. § 240.14e-5.
308 Id. § 240.14d-7(a). A withdrawal right gives a shareholder who has tendered her
shares to a depository institution the right to have her shares returned before the
closing. OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 162 n.155.
309 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (West 2009); see also id. § 1707.0 1(V). A
Lexis-Nexis search of the "OH Department of Commerce; Division of Securities
Decisions" database for the search term "1707.041" renders only forty-five
decisions. The latest decision was issued in 2001 and all but seven decisions were
issued prior to 1990.
310 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
"' Id. at 643-46 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
312 Id. at 639 (plurality opinion).
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to review tender offers for substantive fairness, rather than let shareholders
exclusively decide whether to accept an offer.313 The latter provision
frustrated the federally determined balance between bidders and target
shareholders.
Once the Illinois Takeover Act was struck down in ITE Corp., states,
including Ohio, enacted second generation antitakeover statutes that
required target shareholder approval for business combinations. Like its
experiment with first generation statutes, 314 Ohio was among the first states
to enact its second generation antitakeover statute in 1982, which is called
the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act (CSAA). 315 While Ohio and many
other states already required a supermajority target shareholder vote to
approve mergers and sales of substantially all assets,3 16 the CSAA requires
a separate shareholder and director vote to approve tender offers (i.e.
control share acquisitions), unless a firm has opted out with a charter
provision or regulation (bylaw).317
In the shareholder vote, as originally enacted, the CSAA
disenfranchised shares held by management and the potential acquirer to
address shareholder coercion issues.3 16 Later amendments disenfranchised
additional shares held by market arbitrageurs as well.319 Today, the CSAA
requires that within ten days of announcing the control share acquisition
313 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 80 (1987); MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. at 638-39 (plurality opinion).
314 Shipman, supra note 300, at 771 (identifying the Ohio Takeover Act as "an
interesting and useful experiment").
315 Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act, No. 258, 1982 Ohio Laws 4464 (amending
certain provisions of Title XVII of the Ohio Revised Code); Shipman, supra note
197, at 516.
316 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.76 (West 2009) (asset sale); § 1701.78 (merger);
see also Oesterle, supra note 55, at 65-66.
317 § 1701.83 1(A) (providing that the CSAA is discretionary); § 1701.831(E)(1)
(shareholder vote).
318 Thomas E. Geyer, The Vitality of the Ohio Laws Designed to Encourage
Negotiated Takeovers, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 515, 526-27 (1998) ("Functionally,
the Control Share Acquisition Act sets out three requirements: (i) a potential
acquirer must deliver to the issuing public corporation's principal executive offices
an "acquiring person statement" that sets forth certain minimum information about
the acquirer and the proposed acquisition; (ii) within ten days after receipt of an
acquiring person statement conforming to law, the issuing public corporation's
directors must call a special meeting of shareholders for the purpose of voting on
the proposed control share acquisition ("831 meeting"); and (iii) special quorum
and voting standards are imposed at the 831 meeting.").
319 As of this writing, the CSAA disenfranchises shares acquired within proximity
to the shareholder vote. § 1701.01(CC)(1); Geyer, supra note 318, at 539-40
(explaining the 1997 amendments to the definition of "interested shares" as they
pertain to the CSAA).
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(i.e. tender offer) the target company must call a special meeting (an "831"
meeting) and hold both a director and shareholder vote on the
acquisition.320 Shares purchased after the announcement date of the
acquisition ("interested shares") are not permitted to vote at the 831
meeting. When the tender offer is announced, the CSAA also requires
offerors to disclose certain information to the target company.322
Second generation antitakeover statutes like the CSAA faced
constitutional challenges under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses like
the first generation statutes before them. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics, upheld a second-generation statute in Indiana
similar to the Ohio CSAA.32 3 Read in tandem with MITE Corp., CTS Corp.
granted states significant leeway to enact takeover legislation without
preempting the Williams Act.324 The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
found the CSAA unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause and the
Williams Act in 1987,325 but later upheld the CSAA in 1988 following CTS
Corp.
326
Separate from its serious legal issues, the CSAA simply did not work
because shareholders would approve deals to obtain the share-price
320 § 1701.83 1(C)(1), (E)(1).
321 Id. §§ 1701.01(CC)(1), 1701.831(E)(1). It should be noted that the interested
share provision, which is designed to disenfranchise an arbitrageur's voice in
transactions and protect gains among long-term shareholders, is unnecessary and
impracticable. Arguably, arbitrageurs will decrease target shareholder value in
transactions because arbitrageurs have only a short-term interest in flipping the
stock price, whereas long-term shareholders will want to obtain the full value of a
corporation, including operational value. However, because initial long-term
shareholders who sell to arbitrageurs do so at a fair market price and arbitrageurs
want to make a profit, an arbitrageur's voice in transactions will not support a price
less than the fair market value. Long-term shareholders have already "rung the cash
register," so to speak. As a consequence, arbitrageurs do not have interests
misaligned with long-term corporate interests and are very difficult to identify.322 Id. § 1701.831(B).
323 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
324 See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 79-84 ("In our view, the possibility that the Indiana
Act will delay some tender offers is insufficient to require a conclusion that the
Williams Act pre-empts the Act. The longstanding prevalence of state regulation in
this area suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that
delay the acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said
so explicitly."); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1982).
325 Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D. Ohio 1986),
aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1026 (1987); see also Geyer,
supra note 318, at 528.
326 Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-33 (N.D.
Ohio 1988); see also Geyer, supra note 318, at 529-30.
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premium paid to target shareholders.3 27 Blaming the CSAA's failure on
"market arbitrageurs," Ohio enacted amendments to the CSAA in 1990
328amnmnstdesigned to disenfranchise these arbitrageurs. The 1990 amendments to
the CSAA disenfranchised "interested shares," as defined to include shares
329
obtained within a specific period before the takeover bid announcement.
These amendments led to potentially unreasonable delay in holding up
deals because it was impracticable to timely identify owners of shares held
under "street names," issues with defining the "record date" of the
transaction, and issues with transferring shares separate from voting rights
following the record date. 330 Once again, federal courts were tasked to
determine whether the Williams Act preempted Ohio takeover legislation,
and once again, a federal court found the CSAA unconstitutional.33 ' After
the CSAA withstood a subsequent constitutional challenge in 1996,332 the
Ohio General Assembly addressed the CSAA's constitutional infirmities
with additional legislation in 1997. 333
327 Geyer, supra note 318, at 530 ("However, as the Control Share Acquisition Act
was applied to control share acquisitions in the late 1980s, some practitioners
believed that the Control Share Acquisition Act operated as a 'Trojan Horse' in that
although the proposed control share acquisition went before a vote of the
shareholders, the shareholders typically included market arbitrageurs who would
most likely always vote in favor of the proposed transaction.").
328 Act effective Apr. 11, 1990, No. 180, 1990 Ohio Laws 1610, 1631 (amending
provisions of the general corporation law); see also Geyer, supra note 318, at 530-
31.
329 United Dominion Indus. v. Commercial Intertech Corp., 943 F. Supp. 857, 860-
61 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(CC)(2) and the 1990
amendments).
330 Id. at 862 ("This is the third time this Court has been called upon to consider the
constitutionality of § 1701.01(CC)(2).").
331 Luxottica Grp. S.P.A. v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 919 F. Supp. 1085, 1090-91 (S.D.
Ohio 1995) ("The Court finds that it would be impossible to comply
with § 1701.01(CC)(2) within the sixty day period for reinstituting withdrawal
rights under the Williams Act and that compliance with this particular provision of
the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act would frustrate the Congressional purpose
of preventing undue delay in the consummation of a tender offer."); Danaher Corp.
v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., No. C2-96-0247, slip op. (S.D. Ohio July 1, 1996)
(dismissed because the firms reached an agreement to end the litigation).
332 United Dominion Indus., 943 F. Supp. at 873-74 ("Unlike Luxottica, the Court
in the instant case is unable to find that the procedures necessary to determine the
existence of the second quorum and the results of the second vote would require
delay in the consummation of a tender offer well beyond the parameters set by the
Williams Act.").
333 Act effective Nov. 21, 1997, No. 73, 1997 Ohio Laws 495, 554 (amending
provisions of the general corporation law).
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Ohio adopted its third generation antitakeover statute in 1990-the
"merger moratorium" or "business combination" statute.3 Unless a firm
affirmatively opts out,335 Ohio's business combination statute requires
board of director approval to engage in a transaction with a potential
acquirer for three years following the purchase of an interest in the
company representing more than 5% of the aggregate shareholder value of
the firm or 10% of income earning power.336 Additional restrictions
requiring a shareholder vote are present after the three-year period as
well.337 Measured against Delaware law, the restrictions on subsequent
transactions are comparatively strong.338 As a result, the business
combination statute effectively requires bidders to negotiate with the target
board.
Also in 1990, Ohio adopted its fourth generation antitakeover statute,
which requires bidders to disgorge profits made as a result of failed
takeover attempts from which they derive a profit.339 In these "greenmail"
situations, target management uses shareholder assets to fend off bidders
while protecting the target board's jobs.340 While Ohio's disgorgement
statute is an extremely potent device to deter takeovers, it goes too far and
potentially "shut[s] down the market for corporate control as a disciplining
device" on management.
Ohio's other antitakeover provisions are also relevant here as well
because Ohio's antitakeover regulation is extreme in the aggregate. As
discussed supra Part IV.A.2, Ohio has a constituency statute that provides
excessive management discretion, which shields management from
competitive pressure and shareholder accountability, and ultimately
discourages efficient firms and value-creating transactions. Again, the
constituency statute should be repealed, since antitakeover statutes are
designed to avoid shareholder coercion, and are not a proper regulatory
334 Act effective Apr. 11, 1990, No. 180, 1990 Ohio Laws 1610, 1634 (amending
provisions of the general corporation law).
5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1704.06 (West 2009).336 Id. §§ 1704.01(B)(2)(a)(iii), 1704.02.337 Id. § 1704.03.
338 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2010); see also Davidoff, supra note 4. See
generally Oesterle, supra note 19 (discussing section 203).
9 § 1707.043.
340 Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes, and the Internal Revenue
Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999, and 5881, 35 VILE. L REV
131, 135-36 (1990) ("[G]reenmail may occur in other guises, such as by permitting
raiders to acquire assets from the target corporation on favorable terms or by
allowing payments to raiders by a third party (the 'white knight') cooperating with
the management of the target corporation.").
341 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1862.
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vehicle to benefit non-shareholder constituencies.342 Finally, Ohio adopted
a statute authorizing firms to adopt poison pills with the 1986 reforms.
3 43
This statute should be retained to provide shareholder-authorized takeover
defenses. In some situations, shareholders may rationally delegate authority
to management for takeover defenses, among other reasons, because
information is not readily available and can be costly to gather, and it is
difficult for shareholders to collectively act. 344 Taken in the aggregate,
Ohio's antitakeover statutes are extreme as their complicated history
reflects.
As an initial matter, Ohio should repeal its disgorgement statute
because it is the statute most heavily correlated with negative shareholder
wealth and does not have a well-reasoned purpose.345 To the detriment of
Ohio's business environment, as supported with empirical data, the
disgorgement statute raises the cost of capital to Ohio businesses because
markets identify Ohio firms as inefficient due to protectionist corporate
law.
3 46
Moreover, Ohio's disgorgement statute goes beyond what is required to
encourage bidders to negotiate with management because it also deters
friendly value-creating deals that should be encouraged and entrenches
management from competitive pressure to run efficient firms. Even if the
disgorgement statute did have a purpose supported by policy rationale, it is
duplicative of a federal tax on 50% on greenmail proceeds, which Congress
had enacted prior to the Ohio General Assembly enacting its disgorgement
statute serving the same purpose. 347 Also, the disgorgement statute has not
342 Oesterle, supra note 19, at 906-08; see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d
293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("[O1ne must remember that the substantive coercion
rationale is not one advanced on behalf of employees or communities that might be
adversely affected by a change of control. Rather, substantive coercion is a threat to
stockholders who might sell at a depressed price.").
313 § 1701.16(B); Act effective Nov. 22, 1986, No. 278, 1985-86 Ohio Laws 6107,
6118-19 (amending parts of the general corporation law).
344 Oesterle, supra note 55, at 64-72. There are some situations in which
shareholders have a greater interest in voting on specific decisions. For example, in
situations where management is "selling-out" for personal benefits, engaged in a
management buyout or making major one-time changes in the firm where the costs
of informing shareholders and collective action is cost-effective, shareholders have
more of an interest in voting. OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 151-52; see also
Easterbrook & Fishel supra note 63, at 1442-44; Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
18, at 1172-73; Lewis Komhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to
Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fishel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449,
1456-57 (1989).
345 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1858, 1862-63.
346 Id.; see, e.g., Abercrombie discussion supra Part 1.
347 Zelinsky, supra note 340, at 166-170 (federal taxes on greenmail).
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been shown to attract management more effectively than other antitakeover
statutes.348 For these reasons, Ohio should repeal its disgorgement statute.
In addition to repealing the disgorgement statute, Ohio should
consolidate the control bid statute, the CSAA and the business combination
statute to move Ohio towards coherent and straightforward antitakeover
regulation. Under this proposal, Ohio's business combination statute should
be retained as a takeover defense that strongly encourages bidders to
negotiate with the board of directors.349 Further grounded in policy
rationale, Ohio's business combination statute may be an effective tool to
attract quality management so long as it is not taken to the extreme.35°
Ohio's business combination statute is stronger than comparative third
generation antitakeover statutes, but if other statutes are repealed Ohio
antitakeover legislation in the aggregate would not be extreme on the
whole. Also, the business combination statute's complexity may be one
instance where complex drafting is desirable to encourage potentially
hostile bidders to negotiate with the board of directors.35" ' Due to its
complexity, acquirers may go first to the board of directors to avoid the
burden of interpreting the statute.352 By contrast, complexity in other
provisions serves only as a transaction or operating cost. Complexity in the
CSAA, for example, is not desirable because it imposes a transaction cost in
friendly deals where acquirers already negotiate with the board of
directors.353 Notably, discretion to opt out of the business combination
statute, as Ohio currently provides,3 54 should be provided to avoid the high
costs associated with an inflexible mandatory statute.
While the business combination statute should be retained, the CSAA
and the control bid statute warrant considerable revision and potential
repeal. The CSAA should be repealed because the business combination
statute already drives bidders to negotiate with the target board. As noted
above, when bidders cannot negotiate friendly deals with the target board,
they generally make a tender offer followed by a proxy contest and back-
348 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1838.
349 Geyer, supra note 318, at 552 ("Commentary suggests that the General
Assembly enacted this 'merger moratorium statute' to deter hostile takeovers by
limiting the bidder's ability to carry out a second stage clean-up merger after the
initial tender offer, and to encourage those persons proposing to acquire control of
an issuing public corporation to negotiate with the target corporation's board of
directors.").
350 See Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1804-05.
351 See Thomas Geyer, An Overview of Ohio's Takeover Laws, OHIO CORP. LAWS
OUTLINE (Bailey Cavalieri LLC, Columbus, Ohio), Sept. 16, 2003, at 9.352 Id.
353 Shipman, supra note 197, at 517.
354 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1704.06 (West 2009).
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end merger .3" The CSAA is designed to make the first step, the tender
offer, more difficult with a disinterested shareholder vote.356 The business
combination statute addresses the second step because business
combinations following a tender offer require board or shareholder
approval.357 As the business combination statute effectively addresses the
second step, i.e. the back-end merger or other transaction, bidders must
negotiate with the target board or win a proxy contest to complete a
business combination.
The CSAA is therefore superfluous and unnecessary because potential
acquirers already must negotiate with the target board. CSAA supporters
may argue that the statute is designed to effectively stop proxy contests, in
which the potential acquirer can elect a friendly target board that will
approve the transaction. The CSAA, however, does not function to stop a
proxy contest because it presupposes that market arbitrageurs, target
directors and other interested shareholders have a short-term perspective
that is not in all shareholders' or other stakeholders' best interests, which
again raises the stakeholder debate.358
Further, in the tender offer context, even if market arbitrageurs hold
interested shares and do not care about the firm in the long-term, previous
shareholders have already sold their shares at a market price based upon
their long-term perspective. As a consequence, the shares are properly
355 Oesterle, supra note 19, at 894; see, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del. 1995).
356 Geyer, supra note 318, at 524 ("The general purpose of the Control Share
Acquisition Act is to ensure that those who hold shares in a corporation before a
takeover bid is announced have a sufficient opportunity to both consider and vote
upon the proposal.").
157 § 1704.02.
358 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 540.
The subjective premise was the Court of Chancery's sua sponte
determination that Unitrin's outside directors, who are also
substantial stockholders, would not vote like other stockholders
in a proxy contest, i.e. in their own best economic interests ....
The Court of Chancery's subjective determination that the
stockholder directors of Unitrin would reject an "excellent
offer," unless it compensated them for giving up the "prestige
and perquisites" of directorship, appears to be subjective and
without record support. It cannot be presumed ....
[Sltockholders are presumed to act in their own best economic
interests when they vote in a proxy contest.
Id. (citations omitted). Admittedly, in Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court
inconsistently noted that shareholders were not capable of deciding whether to
accept a tender offer but were competent to decide a proxy contest on the merits.
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387; Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 325-29 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (discussing the court's reasoning in Unitrin).
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valued to reflect this long-term perspective and the CSAA is unnecessary to
avoid shareholder coercion. In this way, notwithstanding arbitrageurs, the
market for corporate control works to hold target management accountable
to shareholders to run efficient companies in a competitive environment. To
the extent there are director conflicts in takeovers, these issues should be
addressed with fiduciary duties that require directors to act in shareholders'
best interests.359 Separately, the disclosure requirements under the control
bid statute and the CSAA should be consolidated in a manner that is
complementary to disclosure requirements under the Williams Act.
4. A Starting Point for Reform: The Revised Model Business
Corporation Act
One solution is the adoption of the RMBCA. Similarly adopting a
model act, the Ohio General Assembly codified parts of the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) in 1997.36 o If adopted, the RMBCA may
provide a legal environment that will attract investment with
straightforward and neutral corporate law. Furthermore, the RMBCA is
regularly updated, which will provide a basis for future legislative reform
and reduce legislative reform costs. 36 1 Any departures from the RMBCA
should be based upon deliberate policy decisions and drafted in a
straightforward manner. Under this principle, the General Assembly may
amend the RMBCA, for example, if it decides that antitakeover legislation
should consist primarily of a stand-alone business combination statute. By
contrast, confusing provisions that needlessly generate legal expenses
should be avoided when more conventional statutes could implement the
same policy decisions. Consequently, the CSAA and the Control Bid
Statute may warrant repeal.
C. Limited Liability Companies-Chapter 1705
The Ohio LLC statute should be revised to provide needed flexibility to
Ohio LLCs and provide a distinct alternative to Ohio LLPs. Ohio enacted
its first LLC act in 1994.362 In enacting their codes, Ohio and other states
359 Oesterle, supra note 63, at 131 ("Courts should therefore accept the task of
evaluating whether target managers have acted as faithful negotiating agents
whenever plans that empower target managers to act as negotiators are adopted or
exercised.").
360 § 1776 et seq. See generally Jeanne M. Rickert, Ohio's New Partnership Law,
57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 783 (2009). Although still important in many respects,
partnership law is less significant in recent years with the popularity of LLCs as the
entity of choice among many entrepreneurs.
361 Carney, supra note 35, at 742-43.362 Act effective July 1, 1994, No. 103, 1994 Ohio Laws 634 (providing for the
formation and governance of LLCs).
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conceived of LLCs as resembling partnerships, as the IRS required at that
time to obtain flow-through partnership taxation status.363 In 1997, the IRS
adopted check-the-box regulations, which no longer required LLCs to adopt
formalistic characteristics of a partnership to obtain flow-through
taxation.3 64 In light of this development, many states revised their LLC
statutes365 to shift from the partnership model to pursue some strategic
advantages of a corporation, including capital lock-in and transferability of
member interests.36 6 In creating its new LLC statute, Ohio maintained a
partnership basis for some prominent provisions.36 7 As a result, Ohio LLCs
are a questionable combination of corporate and partnership entity
characteristics.
1. Fiduciary Responsibility Under Ohio LLC Law
The most notable issue with the Ohio LLC statute is that it does not
permit extensive contractual modification to fiduciary duties, limiting
363 Robert Galloway, Limited Liability Companies May Now Be Formed in Ohio, 4
OHIO PROB. L.J. 137, 137-38 (1994).
364 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (2011); see also Catherine M. Rogers, Business
Organizations-Staying Afloat with a Hole in the Wyoming LLC Act: Default Rules
in a Contractual LLC World, 5 Wyo. L. REv. 351, 361-62 (2005). Four
characteristics identified as necessary for LLC status prior to the check-the-box
regulations include: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralized management; (3) free
transferability of interests; and (4) limited liability. Id. at 358.
365 See, e.g., Ohio Limited Liability Company Act, No. 102, 1999 Ohio Laws 3358
(amending sections in chapter 1705 of the Ohio Revised Code); see also Kevin
Gluntz, Are LLC's Now the Ohio Entity of Choice for Estate Planning Purposes?,
10 OHIO PROB. L.J. 29, 30 (2000); Charles W. Murdock, Limited Liability
Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law Developments
and Their Implications for the Future, 56 Bus. LAW. 499, 501-02 (2001) (noting
that many states shifted their LLC statutes from the partnership to the corporation
model).
366 The wave of new state LLC laws following the check-the-box regulations
suggests that certain partnership characteristics are widely considered to be
undesirable, including provisions addressing transferability rights, withdrawal
rights and dissolution rights. See John Dwight Ingram, Limited Liability
Companies, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REv. 1, 2 & n. 10 (2007) (citing state statutes
enacted following the check-the-box regulations). Contractual modification of
fiduciary duties may be a desirable feature of LLC laws. Murdock, supra note 365,
at 500, 535.
367 Committee Comment to § 1705.281, 2012 Leg., 129th Gen. Assemb. File No. 72
(Ohio 2012) ("The language of this section is based on the comparable provision of
Ohio's partnership law, section 1776.44."); see also Jeanne Rickert, Randy Walters
& Ashley Gullet, BOOM! Ohio Business Law Gets an Upgrade, OHIO LAW.,
July/Aug. 2012, at 22 ("Members' duties are substantially the same as the duties of
partners in a partnership.").
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flexibility.3 68 Like partnerships, Ohio requires LLC members and managers
to have mandatory fiduciary duties beyond the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.369 These duties include the duty of care and the duty
of loyalty. The duty of loyalty specifically prohibits member competition
with the LLC.370 LLC operating agreements may provide provisions to
amend these duties, but only if the modifications are not "manifestly
unreasonable. 371 While Ohio should require the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the mandatory duties of care and loyalty are troublesome.
The duty of care is problematic as it relates to both LLC managers and
members. The duty of care for managers is troublesome because Ohio
managers are held to a negligence (i.e. ordinarily prudent person) standard
for fiduciary responsibility, as opposed to the more typical gross negligence
368 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.081(B), 1705.281, 1705.282, 1705.29(B) (West
Supp. 2012); see Elizabeth S. Miller, Are the Courts Developing a Unique Theory
of Limited Liability Companies or Simply Borrowing from Other Forms?, 42
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 617, 635-36 (2009); see, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing
Ohio Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 279, 279
(2009) (stating that "Delaware amended its limited liability company (LLC) law to
allow for the contractual elimination of fiduciary duties."). But see Sandra K.
Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the
Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 243, 263
(2009) (arguing for "a Theory of Mandatory Core Duties that recommends that
LLC legislation retain a mandatory core of fiduciary duties that cannot be
contractually eliminated."). In contrast to Delaware law, Miller advocates for
limited legislative restrictions on contractually modifying fiduciary duties.
Compare §§ 1705.281, and 1705.282, and 1705.29, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 17-1101(c)-(d) (West 2010). Illinois has a fiduciary duty law for LLCs similar to
Miller's model. See Murdock, supra note 365, at 535.
369 §§ 1705.281-.282; Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the
duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion'
of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been
kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be
lowered by any judgment of this court." (citations omitted)); see also Rickert,
supra note 360, at 791 (noting that Ohio partnership law provides for mandatory
fiduciary duties).
370 § 1705.28 1(B)(3) ("To refrain from competing with the limited liability
company in the conduct of the limited liability company's business before the
dissolution of the limited liability company.").
37 Id. § 1705.081(B).
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standard.372 The constituency provision that provides added protection for
corporate directors under Ohio Revised Code section 1701.59(F) is not
present under the LLC statute for LLC managers, leading to potential for
litigation regarding Ohio LLCs.373 Similarly, the duty of care for members
provides unnecessary potential for liability or the need to contractually
modify LLC operating agreements to reduce potential for member
liability.3 74 In addition, the mandatory duty of loyalty, specifically the duty
not to compete, is problematic for small business owners who manage more
than one business as an LLC, or in situations where investors come together
for a specific investment opportunity but otherwise pursue other business
ventures.375
A prominent case in Ohio LLC jurisprudence, McConnell v. Hunt
Sports, demonstrates that LLC fiduciary duties are material to Ohio's
business environment.376 In McConnell, uncertainty regarding fiduciary
duties raised doubt as to whether a group of Ohio investors could raise
capital to attract a major business interest-the Columbus Blue Jackets of
the NHL.377 As explained infra Part V, the Ohio court in McConnell used
potentially flawed reasoning to interpret the operating agreement, which
enabled a group of investors to make a poor investment. That poor
investment later led to a questionable public bailout with serious issues
under the Ohio Constitution.378 Again, McConnell demonstrates that LLC
372 /d. § 1705.29(C)(1).
371 Id. § 1705.29.
374 Id. § 1705.281(C).
375 Dale Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State
Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev.
881, 896-97 (1995) (noting that participants in small corporations often divide their
time among several corporations); Jason Sims, Beware of Ohio LLCs: New Law
Changes the Game for LLC Members, WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL? BLOG (May 9,
20 12), http://www.thebigdealblog.com/whatsthebigdeal/whatsthebigdeaU2012/05/
09/beware-ohio-llc.
376 McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1214-15 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999); see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry:
Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv.
91, 104-05, 132 (2011) (noting that the quality of courts is more statistically
significant as to firms' decision where to form an LLC).
371 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
378 See generally Dave Ebersole, Democracy in Ohio: Ohio's Fiscal Constitution
and the Unconstitutional Nationwide Arena Deal, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
(forthcoming Dec. 2012). The Nationwide Arena deal violates restrictions in the
Ohio Constitution on public investment in the private sector. Id As part of the
bailout, an LLC disclaiming its mandatory fiduciary duties under Ohio law was
created in contravention to Ohio LLC law. See Operating Agreement of Columbus
Arena Management LLC, Section 5.3(b) (on file with the author) ("Duties of
Managers. The Members and the Company acknowledge and agree that each
Manager serves to represent the interests of the Person entitled to designate such
514 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
fiduciary duties are material to Ohio's business environment. Further, the
noted issues with Ohio LLCs could have a detrimental impact on Ohio's
business environment.
2. Contractually Modifying Fiduciary Duties in Ohio LLCs
Despite mandatory LLC fiduciary duties, Ohio practitioners may be
able to amend LLC operating agreements as desired in most situations.379
But in light of the issues with LLC fiduciary duties noted above, Ohio
practitioners may need to modify fiduciary duties as a matter of course. If
practitioners choose to use Ohio LLCs, these modifications will create
unnecessary legal expense and are uncertain in effect. 380 Litigation costs
can be significant to small businesses, and may explain why the quality of
the legal environment has been empirically shown to be a leading factor in
jurisdictional competition for privately held LLCs. 8
Under a manifestly unreasonable standard, operating agreements will
need to be very specific in curtailing fiduciary duties.382 Moreover, the
manifestly unreasonable standard provides judges with little guidance or
criteria for enforcement, thereby inviting judges to interfere with business
Manager and will not owe any fiduciary or other duties to any other Member and is
entitled to make decisions and take action solely on the basis of the interests of the
Person entitled to designate such Manager."). The Columbus Arena Management
(CAM) operating agreement may comply with Ohio LLC law, however, if the
effective date on May 4, 2012 followed the Blue Jackets bailout. Nonetheless,
questions persist because the 2012 committee comments to section 1705.29 of the
Ohio Revised Code state that changes to LLC fiduciary duties "clarify," rather than
substantively change, Ohio LLC law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.29 cmt. (West
Supp. 2012). Moreover, local media reports in May 2012 raised transparency issues
with CAM. See, e.g., Lucas Sullivan, O'Brien: Arena Dealings Must Be Public,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 22, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local12012/05/22/obrien-arena-dealings-must-be-public.html.
379 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 376, at 104-05.
380 Some practitioners advise clients to create LLCs in other states because of Ohio
law. E.g., Sims, supra note 375; John E. Sullivan III & D. Bowen Loeffler, Ohio
LLCs After Florida's Olmstead Decision: Why Ohio LLCs Are No Good Anymore,
How to Fix Them, and What to Do Until They Are Fixed, 21 OHIO PROB. L.J. 66,
66 (2010) (advising practitioners to avoid Ohio LLCs largely due to debtor
protection concerns addressed in H.B. 48, 129th Ohio G.A. (2011)).
381 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 376, at 104, 129-30 (noting that court
quality is an important factor in jurisdictional competition for LLCs); see also
Henry Butler & Larry Ribstein, Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1990) (noting that fiduciary
duties impose costs including litigation costs associated with court interpretation).
382 Sims, supra note 375.
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affairs.383 Supporters of the manifestly unreasonable standard argue that
vague terms are commonplace in law and that courts will develop criteria,
including whether a fiduciary waiver is clear and unambiguous, to carve-
out its meaning.384 But courts may construe terms to be clear and
unambiguous in situations where they are not, as was the case in
McConnell.385 As a result, mandatory fiduciary duties under the manifestly
386
unreasonable standard impose serious costs on Ohio LLCs.
Advocates for mandatory fiduciary duties echo the arguments refuted
supra in the corporation context. Supporting this position are related
arguments that hark back to the constituency position in the stakeholder
debate, which is predicated on unequal bargaining power and inefficient
markets.387 Because LLCs generally appeal to closely-held firms,388 the
stakeholder debate should focus on bargaining power issues in the LLC
context.
389
383 Oesterle, supra note 375, at 906-14 (discussing factors that affect judicial
contractual interpretation).
384 Mark Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In
Defense of the "Manifestly Unreasonable" Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 431-
32 (2006).
385 See McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1203, 1206 (Ohio Ct.
AIp. 1999).
38 See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209,
232-37 (2005) (identifying costs arising from fiduciary duties in non-corporate
forms).
387 Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity
Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 555, 564
n.45 (2012) ("Among other concerns, traditionalists argue that subjecting fiduciary
duties to contractual waivers confuses basic legal doctrine; deifies efficiency at the
expense of fairness, trust, and other social values; relies on an overly simplistic
notion of the contractual bargaining process; overestimates the prescience of those
drafting contracts; imposes costs on third parties who rely on or transact with
alternative entities; undermines investor confidence and the broader economy;
represents a radical shift in tradition, which may have unforeseen consequences;
and will lead to the outright demise of fiduciary protection, as contractual waivers
become standard and ubiquitous."); see also Miller, supra note 367, at 263, 271.
388 Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with
the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the
LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1628 (2004) ("Within Delaware, courts have
consistently refused to impute heightened fiduciary duties to LLCs because of the
closely held nature of the LLC."); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice
of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 79, 89 (2001) ("LLC
statutes are better adapted than standard corporation statutes to closely held
firms."). But see Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 477 (2009).
389 One advocate for mandatory LLC fiduciary duties, Professor Loewenstein, also
cites free market principles when arguing against LLC freedom to contract.
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LLCs are based upon freedom to contract.39 ° With the ability to tailor
business entities to a particular venture, LLCs provide flexibility to closely
held firms with investors who may negotiate the operating agreement.39'
The relative insignificance of publicly traded alternative entities (e.g.,
publicly traded LLCs and LPs) in the alternative-entity markets reflects that
392the LLCs are generally a vehicle for closely held firms. In the closely
held context, investor collective action problems are not as great and
bargaining power does not present an issue significant enough to place third
party interests above the contracting parties (i.e. LLC members), or limit
the LLC as an investment tool.
Active investors in an LLC may rationally decide to curtail fiduciary
duties because fiduciary duties are unnecessary in some situations and
impose costs on LLCs.393 Fiduciary duties as monitoring devices in the
LLC may be unnecessary due to other mechanisms that provide investor
protection, including member voting.394 In the closely held context, voting
Loewenstein argues that mandatory fiduciary duties are efficient because fiduciary
duties enhance the market for corporate (business entity) control. Loewenstein,
supra note 384, at 438-39. So the argument goes, without mandatory fiduciary
duties, investors will cede power to management to ward off hostile takeovers,
which in turn makes the market for corporate control less efficient. Id. But an LLC
does not derive its efficiency primarily from the market like a corporation with
dispersed shareholders. Instead, LLCs may use alternative monitoring devices to
promote firm efficiency, such as voting. Ribstein, supra note 386, at 233. Again,
voting is a practical monitoring device in the LLC context due to its often closely
held nature. If active LLC investors wish to use markets to discipline LLC
managers, they may provide provisions to compel distribution or termination,
which gives management a strong incentive to maintain firm value. Larry Ribstein,
The Mystery of the Success of Delaware Law: The Uncorporation and Corporate
Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 139-40 (2009) ("Provisions requiring
termination and liquidation are common in venture capital and private equity
funds.").
390 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West 2010) ("It is the policy of this
chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to
the enforceability of limited liability company agreements."). Moreover, default
rules provide for fiduciary duties even in jurisdictions that do not require them.
Because the LLC does not generally derive its efficiency from the market for LLC
control, the takeover market does not justify mandatory fiduciary duties.
391 Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 537, 550 (1997) ("Fiduciary waivers in unincorporated firms
closely resemble the sort of 'real' contracts that anticontractarians have held out as
models in the public corporation debate.").
392 See Manesh, supra note 387, at 572, 574 (noting that the eighty-five publicly
traded alternative entities studied may not represent the thousands of Delaware
alternative entities in existence). But see Manesh, supra note 388, at 514
(predicting the "ascendency of the noncorporate form").
393 Ribstein, supra note 386, at 232-37; Ribstein, supra note 392, at 548-50..
394 See Ribstein, supra note 387, at 233.
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can be a very useful device for investor control because active investors
may aggregate and collect information without the prohibitive costs
associated with voting among passive investors. LLCs may also adopt
alternative monitoring devices for managers, including mandatory
distributions, a limited life and mandatory liquidation and instituting
managers as full-fledged owners.395 Fiduciary duty costs include both
litigation expenses that may arise to interpret fiduciary duties and
weakening extralegal incentives to refrain from opportunistic conduct.396 At
least in some circumstances, investors are better off waiving fiduciary
duties, and when fiduciary duties are waived in these situations, LLCs have
a lower cost of capital than they otherwise might.
3. Moving Towards a New Ohio LLC Statute
While Ohio LLC fiduciary duties contravene the flexibility that is so
important to the LLC form, Ohio LLC law does provide flexibility to
provide LLCs with capital lock-in. Typical of corporations, capital lock-in
is an attractive entity characteristic because it enables business associations
to allocate capital for long-term planning.397 Indeed, Ohio amended its
original LLC act to limit LLC member withdrawal rights under the default
provisions and shield LLC members from creditors with debtor protection
regarding their LLC interest.
398
Other characteristics have been identified as important to state
competition for LLCs, including the quality of the legal environment and
the degree of uniformity among jurisdictions.399 Ohio should examine its
degree of uniformity with other states regarding LLC provisions, including
withdrawal and dissociation rights.
400
In sum, the Ohio LLC statute should provide Ohio LLCs with
flexibility that is attractive to investors. 40' But in pursuing desirable entity
characteristics, LLCs should avoid some undesirable partnership
395 Manesh, supra note 387, at 565-66.
396 Ribstein, supra note 388, at 232-37.
397 Ribstein, supra note 389, at 138 ("[C]orporations have the unique characteristic
of capital lock-in, or liquidation protection. This insulates corporate assets and,
more importantly, managers' power from the owners' ability to force liquidation.").
398 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.16 (West 2009) (withdrawal rights); § 1705.19
(debtor protection).
399 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 376, at 104-08.
400 LLC uniformity factors into the jurisdictional competition for LLCs, but some
scholars have questioned whether adoption of RULLCA promotes uniformity with
other states. Id. at 107-08.
401 Oesterle, supra note 375, at 883-84 (identifying "hands-off' LLC statutes in
states such as Delaware that seek flexibility for LLCs).
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characteristics. 4 2 The LLP provides an appropriate vehicle if practitioners
seek an entity with mandatory fiduciary duties, other partnership
characteristics and limited liability.4 3
To implement these policies, the Ohio LLC statute should provide
default rules with fiduciary duties, but allow modification to eliminate all
fiduciary duties other than the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Delaware and the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (RULLCA) embrace flexibility and freedom to contract. Specifically,
they permit contractual modification to fiduciary duties so long as the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is preserved.4 ° 4 Using
RULLCA as a foundation, Ohio LLC law may be amended to implement
deliberate policy in a straightforward manner.40 5 With added flexibility
regarding fiduciary duties, Ohio LLC law is better positioned to facilitate
investment in Ohio.
D. Securities Regulation-Chapter 1707
Ohio securities regulation should be revised to lessen the burden on in-
state businesses with more clarity and predictability. Specifically, Ohio
securities laws should reflect recent changes to federal securities regulation
and clearly define key terms. State securities laws (i.e. blue sky laws)
should be designed to avoid preempting or otherwise crowding out federal
securities regulation.40 6 In support of this goal, the National Securities
402 Murdock, supra note 365, at 501-02 (noting that many states shifted their LLC
statutes from the partnership to the corporation model).
43 Oesterle, supra note 375, at 882 n.4 ("Limited partnerships, long in place, give
limited liability to limited but not general partners. Using corporations as general
partners effects full limited liability if the general is adequately capitalized, but the
complicated paperwork required has to be correct .... Moreover, the limited
partners cannot control the incorporated general partner without some risk."
(citations omitted)); see, e.g., §§ 1782.19, 1782.241.
404 REVISED UNiF. LIMITED LTD. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); see also Stan Johnson,
Duties Under the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act: Analysis of a
Statutory Conflict, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 551, 569 (2002) (discussing freedom to
contract under the Delaware Act).
405 See Murdock, supra note 365, at 570 ("There is something to be said for a
moratorium on the constant tinkering or, in some cases, complete overhaul that is
going on with LLC statutes."); see id. at 500 (stating that a uniform act for LLCs is
desirable to create continuity among states that was lost with the adoption of the
check-the-box regulations).
406 State securities regulation reform should coordinate with federal securities
regulation to avoid overburdensome regulation, especially in areas where federal
regulation is minimal such as private placements. See JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 240-42 (6th ed. 2009) (noting
that state blue sky laws can burdensome to issuers raising capital, but also citing
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Improvement Act requires that states avoid preempting federal securities
registration requirements.407 Indeed, Ohio law contains a "qualification by
coordination" provision to provide that satisfaction of federal registration
requirements dually satisfies state requirements.4 °8
However, Ohio securities law is still overreaching in other areas
because it does not fit well with federal laws. State antitakeover statutes, for
example, crowd federal regulation under .the Williams Act.40 9 Moving
forward, state regulation should coordinate with federal regulation with a
focus on areas that federal law does not regulate.
In addition to coordination with federal law, Ohio law could provide
more clarity regarding key terms in securities regulation. The definition of
"1security,' 4A ° for example, is so ambiguous that it could be interpreted to
regulate mortgages.41 ' But policy rationale suggests that mortgages are
outside the scope of state securities regulation due to other regulatory
bodies. In addition, Ohio should amend chapter 1707 to define "materiality"
and provide certainty to businesses making disclosures. With a clear and
predictable scope of materiality, Ohio businesses may avoid costs resulting
from unnecessarily excessive disclosure and legal liability.41 2 Although
whole-scale revision of Ohio's securities laws is not necessary and the
Uniform Securities Act (USA) is somewhat dated, the USA may serve as a
reference point for the appropriate scope of regulation and clarity in
legislative drafting.413
V. OBJECTIONS TO TITLE XVII REFORM
The debate over Title XVII reform may more appropriately be one of
degree, rather than one of absolutes. That is, surely some revision to Title
the Coordinated Equity Review program and the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act as efforts to provide uniformity among jurisdictions).
407 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3417 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
408 § 1707.09.
409 See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
410 § 1707.01(B).
411 See id. (including "title" within the definition of a "security," which could be
construed to include an interest in real estate).
412 Dale Oesterle, The Overused and Under-defined Notion of "Material" in
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 167, 169 (2011) ("[This] paper concludes with
an argument for explicit exceptions, common in the stock exchange listings of
other countries as well as our own.").
413 The Uniform Securities Act of 2002 has been adopted in Missouri, Oklahoma,
Idaho, South Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, the US Virgin Islands, South Carolina, Maine,
Vermont, Minnesota, Hawaii and Indiana. STATE OF Wis. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., A
Brief History of Securities Regulation, http://www.wdfi.org/fi/securities/regexemp/
history.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
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XVII is warranted. Nonetheless, objections that challenge conventional
wisdom support maintaining Title XVII as written. Namely, separate
arguments opposing Title XVII reform assert the following two things: (1)
Delaware corporate law is less certain than Ohio law; and (2) some business
laws do not matter.
A. Certainty Under Ohio and Delaware Law
Ohio law advocates assert that Title XVII as written is necessary to
maintain certainty to businesses under Ohio's largely statutory corporate
law.414 As the argument goes, Delaware's common law system of corporate
law does not provide businesses with certainty, but rather subjects
businesses to the "whim" of a court.415 However, leaving fact-specific legal
standards (i.e. fiduciary duties) to codified law is inherently problematic
and leads to extreme policy positions. Moreover, the advantages of Ohio
corporate law are unclear because Delaware is widely considered to provide
certainty in corporate governance, Ohio corporate law is subject to
interpretation by Ohio courts and policy decisions that should be debated
are implicit in Ohio's supposedly certain law.
First, Delaware's common law system of corporate law provides
businesses with certainty. In fact, the market for corporate law supports this
position-Delaware incorporates 59% of all Fortune 500 companies and
more than half of all U.S. corporations. 4 Expedient courts, predicable case
law, expert judges, inter alia, provide businesses with certainty of the
law.417
Moreover, it is not clear that a civil system of law is more favorable
than common law. Common law provides incremental evolution of the law
that does not support populist overreaction to current events. For example,
the last two economic downturns in the United States have resulted in
sweeping financial reform providing burdensome regulations-namely the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Similarly, in
Ohio, the CSAA was adopted following a corporate threat to relocate and a
case in another jurisdiction holding directors liable for breaching fiduciary
duties. Delaware common law, by contrast, benefits the state with
414 Kevin Kinross, 0-H-Inc.?, ACREDULA (Bricker & Eclder, Columbus, Ohio),
Mar. 2, 2011, at 2.
415 Feran, supra note 10 ("In Delaware, it's left up to a court, on what whim the
Delaware courts are on." (quoting John Beavers)); see also John Beavers, Why It's
Important to Have Certainty About Directors'Protections, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 15,
2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/detai.aspx?ga79dea16-c986-4be8-992d-
d4eedc2353ba.
416 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 1, at 389.
417 See discussion supra Part III.B.
2012 Reforming Ohio Corporate Law and Securities 521
Regulation to Facilitate Investment in Ohio
incremental change from expert judges with no jury trials, which is
especially appropriate with complex corporate law.
Critics argue that common law suffers from pitfalls that are not present
under a civil system. As case law is fact specific, there is an opportunity for
418courts to avoid ruling on issues under the facts of a particular case.
Moreover, case law may be difficult to alter if certain facts do not arise in a
case that goes to trial. Nonetheless, common law has proven effective for
state corporate law, which often addresses fact-specific inquiries.
Second, it is not clear that Ohio courts apply Ohio law more predictably
than Delaware courts apply Delaware law, or contemplate the consequences
of their decisions on businesses. McConnell v. Hunt Sports, for example,
interpreted an LLC agreement in a questionable manner.41 9 In McConnell,
members of an LLC bidding for the Columbus Blue Jackets franchise broke
apart from the original entity and formed a new group that eventually won
the franchise.420 At issue was whether the new group owed a fiduciary duty
to the original LLC. The court interpreted the following clause in the LLC
agreement to allow members of the original LLC to compete, essentially
with themselves, for the franchise:
Members May Compete. Members shall not in any way be
prohibited from or restricted in engaging or owning an
interest in any other business venture of any nature,
including any venture which might be competitive with the
421business of the Company.
The court held that its interpretation of the agreement was "clear and
unambiguous. 422 It is reasonable, however, to interpret the clause as
allowing competition only in the general course of business, not in the
418 See, e.g., Beavers, supra note 415.
419 McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). As a
matter of fiduciary responsibility, McConnell held that LLC fiduciary duties may
be contractually limited. Id. at 1214-15.420 Id. at 1201-02.
421 Id. at 1206-07, 1215 (emphasis added). The court stated that:
The operating agreement constitutes the undertaking of the
parties herein. In becoming members of CHL, appellant and
appellees agreed to abide by the terms of the operating
agreement, and such agreement specifically allowed competition
with the company by its members. As such, the duties created
pursuant to such undertaking did not include a duty not to
compete. Therefore, there was no duty on the part of appellees to
refrain from subjecting appellant to the injury complained of
herein.
Id. at 1215.
422 Id. at 1203, 1206.
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course of franchise negotiations that "take away [the LLC's] only
purpose. ''423 Moreover, if the contract were not read as clear and
unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent would have been
admissible and the outcome of the case may have been different.4 24 To be
sure, under the facts in McConnell, the original LLC was not likely to
continue bidding against the new entity, but the court did not rest on that
ground.425 Also, this consideration should not change the legal analysis
within the four comers of the "clear and unambiguous" contract.426 Ohio
statutes and courts therefore do not necessarily provide businesses with
certainty and predictability, especially as compared to those of Delaware.
Because Ohio courts are not more reliable than Delaware courts, the
manifestly unreasonable standard for modifying fiduciary duties in Ohio
LLCs is particularly troublesome.427 By contrast, other states provide
businesses with certainty by allowing very liberal contractual modification
of LLC fiduciary duties.428 As the quality of the legal environment has been
identified as an important factor in attracting LLC filings and corporate
charters, fiduciary duties are material to state interests in fostering business
activity.429 Thus, Ohio courts' interpretation of largely codified Ohio
corporate law cannot justify Ohio corporate law's extreme and complex
nature.
Third, implicit in certainty under current Ohio law is extreme policy.
Corporate law's fact-specific nature, including inquiries into fiduciary
responsibility, makes it very difficult to codify nuanced corporate law. In an
attempt to provide clarity, the Ohio General Assembly has even codified
corporate law legislative history.430 But the result has been Ohio corporate
law that reflects extreme policy positions. That is, any certainty provided to
management by fiduciary duties under codified Ohio corporate law is a
result of very little accountability to shareholders. 43' For example, Ohio's
six antitakeover provisions provide certainty insomuch as they delay or
4213 Id. at 1205.
424 Id. at 1206.
425 McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1215-16 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999) ("Given the above, we conclude as a matter of law that it was not a breach of
fiduciary duty for appellees to form, [sic] COLHOC and obtain an NHL franchise
to the exclusion of CHL.").
426Id. at 1203, 1206.
427 See, e.g., id. at 1206, 1216; see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1705.281 (West Supp.
2012); discussion supra Part IV.B. See generally DiMatteo, supra note 368
(surveying different state laws on the contractual modification of fiduciary duties).
428 See discussion supra Part III.B.
429 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 376, at 129, 136. See generally Black, supra
note 132.
411 E.g., § 1701.832.
431 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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prevent corporate takeovers, but at the expense of unnecessary complexity
and extreme provisions.432
Even if the extreme policy underlying any certainty provided under
Ohio law were desirable to corporations, default rules that require
corporations to opt out of extreme provisions may not be appropriate.
Rather, it may be appropriate to have optional rules that Ohio corporations
may select as they desire. For example, Ohio's heightened business
judgment rule in damages actions could be amended away from an opt out
rule43 3 to an opt in election. In a similar vein, Delaware corporations may
elect a heightened business judgment rule for damages actions under
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. For the
forgoing reasons, it is not clear that Ohio corporate statutes provide
certainty and revisions to Ohio corporate law should be publicly debated.
Moreover, Title XVII reform stands to benefit Ohio public policy.
B. Law Matters
Corporate law matters to businesses in the United States.434 In the
United States, Delaware has not only established itself as a leader in
incorporation choice, 435 but Delaware firms also exhibit greater stock
value.436 Despite some conflicting evidence, a leading study found that IPO
firms incorporating in Delaware are valued about 2% higher than firms that
incorporate in other states.437 By contrast, stock price in Ohio firms
438declined 2% upon implementing Ohio's 1986 corporate law reform.
432 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
433 § 1701.59(E).
434 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, I 18 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 850 (2005) ("To students of corporate law, the proposition that
corporate governance arrangements matter requires little explanation. As the
evidence indicates, the quality of governance arrangements affects firm
performance and shareholder value."); Jens Dammann & Mattias Schtindeln, The
Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79,
107 (2011); Dent, supra note 48, at 141 n. 207, 147 nn.232-35 (citing studies to
show that investors are attracted to firms with good governance mechanisms and
that institutional investors promoted good governance practices); see also Coffee,
supra note 92, at 644 (referring generally to securities regulation and corporate
law).
435 See discussion supra Part III.B.
436 Robert Daires, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525, 532-33 (2001); see also Subramanian, supra note 1, at 1795. But see Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004);
Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 144, at 1784-96 (refuting the Delaware
effect).
437 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 144, at 1787-812.
438 Daines, supra note 436, at 525.
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These shareholder wealth effects suggest that state corporate law. is
material .439
Securities regulation also matters. Internationally, the size of equity
markets varies in similarly situated countries."' While the United States is
a leader among equity markets, its prominence has been challenged in
recent years due at least in part to legal changes in federal securities
regulation, including Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.441 Therefore, legal
rules do have a material effect on a jurisdiction's business climate.
Nonetheless, some still question whether corporate law is important.
442
First, Professor Coffee argues that the umbrella of federal securities
regulation in the United States effectively serves the purpose of corporate
law in many respects." 3 A major purpose for corporate law is to strike a
balance between management and shareholder power to decide corporate
matters. 444 In striking this balance, corporate law addresses the agency
problem that exists among divergent shareholder and management interests
and the collective action problem among diffuse shareholders. However, it
may be asserted that securities regulation and exchange listing requirements
sufficiently address these problems by requiring disclosure of fiduciary
439 As a corollary, there is conflicting evidence that corporate governance
structures, whether privately implemented or by state law default, affects firm
performance. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887,
907-16 (2007). However, conflicting evidence may result because some corporate
governance arrangements are material to firm performance while others are not.
See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance? (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper
No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423.
440 Coffee, supra note 92, at 643-44.
"4 Due to the recent economic decline in the United States, U.S. IPOs severely
declined in 2008 and have increased only marginally in recent years. Clyde
Stoltenberg et al., The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in the U.S. and EU
Capital Market Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests Toward
International Harmonization with Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 577, 588, 625 (2011). China has emerged as a global leader in IPOs. Id. at
625.
442 Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive, supra note 199, at 31-37 (noting that, even
after the 1986 amendments to Ohio corporate law, Ohio directors still face potential
liability under other state and federal laws, including securities laws).
443 Coffee, supra note 92, at 652, 704 (stating that relative uniformity in the federal
law applicable to securities markets will overshadow local corporate law).
Professor Coffee also argues that the critical restraints that most limit agency costs
are contained in federal securities laws rather than state corporate law. Id. at 699;
see also Schrag, Lautzenhiser & Flahive, supra note 199, at 31-37.
444 OESTERLE, supra note 22, at 32; Coffee, supra note 92, at 647 (stating that one
theory posits "that shareholder dispersion depends on the ability of the legal system
to protect minority shareholders"); see also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 739.
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misconduct and providing remedies.445 For example, financial reporting
requirements provide shareholders with transparency in corporate affairs
and hold management accountable for their actions.
But if securities regulation sufficiently addresses agency problems, it is
not clear why shareholder wealth effects are associated with incorporation
choice. Admittedly, the Delaware effect could represent the superior and
expeditious service provided by Delaware Court and the Delaware
Secretary of State's office.446 A more likely explanation, however, is that
securities regulation does not sufficiently address shareholders' interests in
corporate governance in many instances, including fundamental corporate
changes in control. For example, management is not required to
immediately disclose merger negotiations under the securities laws.
447
Federal takeover regulation has been marginally successful at best.4 8 As
such, securities laws may not satisfy shareholders' interests in negotiating a
business combination, which are more aptly protected through fiduciary
responsibility under corporate law.
To be sure, the line between corporate law and securities regulation is
indeed fuZZy. 449 For example, U.S. securities laws regulate tender offers and
proxy access, which materially affects corporate governance.45 °
Nonetheless, federal securities regulation in the United States does not
sufficiently fulfill state corporate law's purpose.
Second, and related to the race debate, law may not matter if
jurisdictions will ultimately converge upon the optimal legal rules regarding
corporate governance and securities regulation. Indeed, one study has found
that state corporate law has been uniformly adopted by 74% of states.
451
However, state corporate law is not uniform in material respects, including
fiduciary responsibilities. 452 By contrast, a federal umbrella of securities
laws has established significant uniformity in securities regulation, although
state blue sky laws do differ in some respects. One explanation for
differences in uniformity among corporate law and securities regulation is
so-called "network externalities. ' '43 Network externalities refer to the
445 Coffee, supra note 92, at 652, 699, 704.
446 See discussion supra Part III.B.
447 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988).
448 Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 211, 247 (2007).
449 Coffee, supra note 92, at 669.451 Id. at 683-91.
451 Carney, supra note 35, at 731.
452 For example, some states, including Delaware, have adopted shareholder
primacy principles, whereas other states, including Ohio, attempt to hold
management accountable to several constituencies. See discussion supra Part
III.A.2.
453 Coffee, supra note 92, at 692.
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phenomenon where a listing in equity markets becomes more valuable as
more users come to the market.454 With more users, the market is more
liquid and predictable, and price spreads narrow. 455 Thus, securities markets
benefit from these network externalities and, as a result, securities
regulation is fairly uniform.456 Corporate law, by contrast, does not provide
as significant externalities. 457 To be sure, network benefits are present in
corporate law insomuch as the high volume of Delaware corporations
provides a greater body of case law to develop corporate law.458
Notwithstanding this benefit, the network benefits in the securities context
are likely stronger.
Other explanations address non-convergence among state corporate law
as well. As noted above, the strength of interest groups in a jurisdiction,
including local attorneys and corporate management, may affect political
outcomes. 459 Also, corporate law debates may reach different outcomes
about the optimal state of the law because corporate law is often context
specific. 460 The type of corporation in a jurisdiction may affect the nature of
its corporate law.46' Closely held corporations may not require the
protection of corporate law against agency problems because either the
same people constitute management and ownership, or a controlling
shareholder block directly monitors management.462 Thus, shareholder
protection may rationally be less protective in a jurisdiction that does not
454 Id. at 693.
455 Id.
411 Id. at 691.
457 See discussion supra Part III.C. But see Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at
586-87.
458 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 32, at 586-87. Also, uniform corporate law
may decrease the cost of legal services by loosening the grip of local attorneys over
such services. Id. at 587; see also Carney, supra note 35, at 721.
419 See discussion supra Part II.B.
460 Coffee, supra note 92, at 659-60.
461 E.g., Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 18, at 1178 (discussing Nevada's
attractiveness as an incorporation choice due to the types of Nevada firms); Martin
Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder
Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 641, 646 (2011) ("I argue
that cross-country differences in corporate ownership structure play a decisive role
in determining why movements against the prevailing powers in corporate
governance took different shapes, given the impact that the existence of large
ownership blocks has on the relationship between different groups of shareholders,
and between shareholders and stakeholders.").
462 Dammann & Schiindeln, supra note 434, at 81. Closely held corporations are
more likely to have a controlling block of shareholders than a publicly traded
company because publicly traded corporations are more liquid due to the equity
markets. Id. Corporate law may be necessary to protect minority shareholders from
the controlling block even if there is no significant agency problem among
shareholders and management. Id. at 90.
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463have many publicly traded companies. Convergence among states in
some respects therefore does not dismiss corporate law as immaterial.
Third, it may be argued that state corporate law does not matter because
firms will contract around state default rules to write corporate charters
with preferred corporate governance rules.464 The relevant data, however,
indicates that firms are heavily influenced by corporate law default rules.465
Moreover, it is not clear that firms can effectively contract around some
mandatory state rules.466 Bargaining among shareholders and management
interests therefore does not trivialize corporate law. Thus, despite
arguments asserting certainty under current Ohio corporate law and
trivializing corporate law, Ohio should reform its corporate law and
securities regulation to facilitate investment in Ohio.
VI. CONCLUSION
Against this backdrop of state corporate law that materially affects
shareholder wealth, there is room and reason for Ohio to compete for
corporate charters and improve its business climate. Somewhat curiously,
the evidence is strong that most states do not actively compete for corporate
law. In Ohio, for example, complex and extremely pro-management
corporate law is not as competitive as Delaware's more neutral laws.
Delaware law is neutral in that it takes shareholder interests into account in
a way that non-competitive states do not because it recognizes that
shareholders, in addition to management, influence corporate decisions and
incorporation choice.46 7 Yet most states do not adopt neutral law or
consistently update corporate law to compete for corporate charters.
States' non-competitive stance for corporate law may be rational
regarding out-of-state firms. Actively competing with Delaware for out-of-
state incorporations may be very difficult and require investment that is
difficult during the current economic crisis. Nonetheless, this explanation
463 See id. at 80-81.
464 Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542,,544 (1990).
465 Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Examination 40 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy,
Research Paper No. 335, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=924578.
466 See id. at 10.
467 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 739-41. For example, Delaware showed
consideration for shareholder interests by adopting a pro-management antitakeover
statute only after a plurality of non-competitive states had done so. Id. at 740.
Management's interests became so strong nationally that Delaware was essentially
forced to adopt the antitakeover statute to remain competitive, even if it
antagonized shareholders. Id.
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does not preclude states from competing to incorporate in-state firms. There
is a home-state bias for incorporations that makes competition for in-state
firms plausible. Moreover, there is only a nominal cost to writing corporate
law that is straightforward and efficient.
To enable Ohio to actively compete to charter firms located in Ohio,
Ohio corporate law should be revised to strike a better balance between
management and shareholders' interests. While corporate law should
maintain deference to management, Ohio corporate law currently gives
management excessive protection that discourages investment in Ohio.
Further, Ohio corporate law may have reached an impasse. By failing to
properly address the agency problem between management and
shareholders, Ohio law has increased the cost of capital to Ohio firms.
Demonstrating this point is Abercrombie's recently failed attempt to
reincorporate in Ohio. Simply put, the overwhelming weight of theoretical
and empirical evidence indicates that Ohio should revise its corporate law
and securities regulation to facilitate investment in Ohio.
Nonetheless, the difficulty in reforming Ohio corporate law and
securities regulation may be a practical issue more so than one based upon
intellect and reasoning. Local attorneys as well as management can have
interests in maintaining extreme and complex corporate law. Investors, on
the other hand, are not likely to be vocal in Ohio government because they
may simply "vote with their feet" and invest under other jurisdictions'
laws.468 Due to dispersed benefits arising from improving Ohio corporate
law, and the resultant collective action problem among Ohioans,
meaningful reform may require an enterprising elected official to take a
stand on the issue. 46 9 Alas, Ohioans and their elected representatives are left
to determine whether policies attracting investment capital and encouraging
efficient businesses will prevail in the debate over Ohio corporate law.
468 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1181.
469 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 725 ("Even absent a change in economic
fundamentals, it is entirely plausible that an enterprising governor will in the future
revamp her state's corporate law, establish a specialized court, and go after a
portion of Delaware's profits.").
